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THE LIGHT OF DEAD STARS
Donald Juneau*
Introduction
The treaty between France and the United States for the purchase
of the Louisiana Territory was signed on April 30, 1803.' When
President Jefferson was informed of its execution, he took steps
to learn about the newly acquired territory,2 calling a special ses-
sion of Congress to ratify the treaty3 and to pass legislation
authorizing the United States to take possession.4
By the time the special congressional session had convened, both
Congress and the President were aware that a portion of the Loui-
siana Territory was extensively settled by Europeans, and that there
was a well-established system of laws and regulations that had
governed the territory for almost a century. In "An Account of
Louisiana," which Jefferson had sent the special session Congress,
he sketched out the legal background of the territory as one mostly
Spanish in origin.5 Although Jefferson probably did not know
its details, within that legal corpus was a systematic, extensive,
and comprehensive set of laws governing and protecting the in-
digenous peoples of Spanish America. It was found mainly in
Recopilacidn de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias (hereafter
Recopilaci6n), a 1680 compilation of all laws, edicts, rescripts,
ordinances, decrees, and regulations made by the Spanish imperial
government for the governance of its ultramarine possessions in
the western hemisphere.' The Recopilaci6n, together with subse-
quent regulations and ordinances, formed a complex, thorough
* LL.B. Tulane, 1966. Member Louisiana and Navajo Nation bars.
The theses and conclusions in this article are those of the author, but it is incumbent
upon him to offer his thanks to a number of persons who variously helped him to arrive
at these theses and conclusions, by advice, counsel, and in some cases, criticism: Lawrence
Aschenbrenner, Esq.; Professor Hans Baade; Professor Mitchell Franklin; Arlinda Locklear,
Esq.; and the Honorable Albert Tate, Jr. None of these persons is responsible for any
errors that may be in the article, but if there is any merit in the endeavor, they deserve
a great deal of credit for their support, encouragement, and inspiration.
The current officers of this Review wish to thank Larry Siria, former Managing
Editor, who undertook the cite-checking for this article.-Editor-in-Chief.
1. 8 Stat. 200, 2 T.I.S. 498 (H. Miller ed. 1931).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 106-109.
3. See infra text accompanying note 111.
4. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 245.
5. See infra text accompanying note 114.
6. For the place of the Recopilacin de Leyes de los Reinos de los Indias in the
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framework of protections for the indigenous peoples within the
colonial domain.7
This essay will show that these protective provisions in the
Recopilaci6n are both a source and a basis of Indian rights in
property. Not only does the Recopilacidn afford a basis for
establishing ownership in property derived from immemorial
aboriginal possession, it can be used to reclaim property wrongfully
dispossessed of an Indian tribe that has used and occupied the
lands for a long period of time. The doctrine of justa prescripcidn,
or aboriginal immemorial and adverse possession, has been ex-
plicitly received into the law of the United States, and the remainder
of the corpus of Spanish law guaranteeing Indian property rights
and interests, to the extent not preempted by federal law-indeed,
federal Indian law contains analogues to many of these Spanish
provisions-is, by a peculiar historical twist, still in effect to this
day in the state of Louisiana.
Additional legal bases for protection of Indian tribal sovereignty
and property rights are as exigent today as they were during the
Spanish colonial era. There is an anti-Indian backlash in full cry
today,' and an accumulation of legal guarantees for Indian tribes
is an urgent necessity for protection against the racism, venality,
and greed of those coveting Indian lands waging judicial and
legislative war against the Indian people.
It is a matter of supreme irony that the autocratic enactments
of the long-dead Spanish empire continue today in full force and
vigor. The Recopilacicn and similar Spanish legislation are as bind-
ing upon us, our courts and our legislatures, as more modern
legislation, such as the Indian Self-Determination and Education
history of Spain in the Americas, see generally J. Os Y CAPDEQmU, HISrTORA DEL DERECHO
ESPAPIOL EN AMERICA Y DEL DERECHO INDIANO 83-100 (1968); C. WALTON, TrE CIVIL LAW
IN SPAi AND MEXIco ch. vi (1851); C. WALTON, Tim CrvM LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH
AMERICA 523 (1900). All quotations of the Recopilaci6n de las Indias in this article are
from the Ignacio Boix edition of 1841, published "con aprobaci6n de la regencia provi-
sional del reino, corregida y aprobada par la sala de Indias del Tribunal Supremo de
Justicia, Madrid."
7. See infra text accompanying notes 64-98.
3. See Shattuck & Norggren, Indian Rights: The Cost of Justice, 227 NATION 70
(July 22, 1978), which describes the reaction to judicial decisions favoring Indians in the
area of land claims and fishing rights. One such group, the "Interstate Congress of Equal
Rights and Responsibilities," uses the rhetoric of egalitarian advocacy as a rationale to
strip legal protections from Indians. See R. BAESH & J. HENDERSON, Tim ROAD: INDIAN
TRIE.,; AND PomcAL LmRT, 291-92 (1980) for a critical summary of the specious claims
of the "Interstate Congress."
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Assistance Act of 1975.1 It is true, as Andr6 Schwartz-Bart said
in the first words of his novel, The Last of the Just, that our
eyes record the light of dead stars.10 The Spanish empire is long
gone and, for the most part, is unlamented. Yet it erected a monu-
ment to the humanity and decency that its humanist reformers
and enlightened despots sought for the Indian people under its
domain. So, in order to understand why the Recopilacidn lives
and affords a powerful new basis for Indian rights, it is necessary
to first review the acquisition and transformation of Louisiane
francais to Luisiana espafiola.
I. The Acquisition and Amalgamation of Louisiana into the
Spanish Colonial Empire
The Louisiana Territory was originally a possession of France.
During the Seven Years' War, France acquired Spain as an ally
against Great Britain.' 2 France lost the war and, with it, its posses-
sions in North America, but by the Family Compact of 1762, Spain
was secretly ceded the province of Louisiana.1 3
It was nearly two years later, in October, 1764, before the colony
of Louisiana was informed of the cession.' This news was not
well received and resulted in heated protests by some colonial
leaders, who dispatched fruitless petitions to Louis XV to annul
the cession." Political opposition increased in direct proportion
to the slowness of the Spanish authorities in taking possession
9. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e).
10. "Nos yeux regoivent la lumi~re d'etoiles mortes." A. ScHwARTz-BARr, LE DER-
NMR DES JUSTEs 11 (1959).
11. France based its title to the Mississippi Valley, or Louisiana, upon the prochs-verbal
of April 9, 1692 by Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle, which claimed that immense valley
for France. I B. FRENCH, HIsToicAL CoLL.cnoNs oF LOUISIANA 46-50 (1846). See also
F. PARKMAN, LA SAu AND ThE DISCOVERY oF THE GREAT WEST, 300-05 (1879).
12. 2 C. GAYARRA HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 91-94 (2d ed. 1879); M. DE VrmtRs DU TER-
RAGE, LEs DERNI)Rm ANN9ES DE LA LOUISIANA FRANCAISE 151-55 (1903); D. Bjork, "The
Establishment of Spanish Rule in the Province of Louisiana, 1762-1770," 11-12 (Ph.D.
diss. Univ. of Calif., 1923).
13. Bjork, supra note 12, at 18-20; 2 GAYARRa, supra note 12, at 89-92; Du TEREAGE,
supra note 12, at 155. The acceptance of the cession by King Carlos III of Spain is set
out in 5 HSTORICAL MnmoiRs oF LOuisIAA 238 (B. French ed. 1853). See generally Shepherd,
The Cession of Louisiana to Spain, 19 POL. Sci. Q. 439 (1904); Z. RASHED, Tan PEACE
OF PARIS 1763 (1951).
14. 2 GAYARRj , supra note 12, at 109-13.
15. Siee de Champigny, Memoir of the Present State of Louisiana, in 5 HISTOMCAL
MEMOIRS OF LOUISIANA, supra note 13, at 144-45; 2 GAYARRt, supra note 12, at 113-14.
The French crown had been indifferent to and neglectful of its Louisiana colony for several
1983]
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of Louisiana, and it was not until May 21, 1765 that Carlos III
appointed as governor Don Antonio Ulloa, a naturalist and scien-
tist, who arrived in New Orleans from Havana on March 17,
1766.16 Because of Louisiana's large and established European
population, and perhaps in recognition of the political opposi-
tion to the Spanish cession, Ulloa was instructed to make no in-
novation in its system of government, which was to be entirely
independent of the laws and practices observed in the other
Spanish-American colonies.1 7 Despite this conciliatory attitude,
Ulloa was unenthusiastically received and the supreme council,
the advisory legislative body of the, French colonial administra-
tion, requested supporting documentation as to his powers and
authority.'I Ulloa discerned the sullenness in the populace and the
rapid depreciation in French currency and sought to address both
problems by issuing a series of commercial regulations aimed at
protecting the inhabitants from commercial exploitation.' 9 These
regulations were ignored and the joint administration by Ulloa
and the French governor, Aubry, continued, to no one's satisfac-
tion, while Ulloa awaited the arrival of Spanish troops so he could
take formal possession of the colony. It was not until January,
1763 that Ulloa, on behalf of the Spanish crown, formally took
possession of Louisiana at Balize, at the mouth of the Mississippi
River.20 During this time, a conspiracy was hatched upriver in
New Orleans, among prominent Louisianians, to expel the Spanish,
with the hope of forcing Louis XV to annul the cession and take
back Louisiana.2 New Orleans was occupied by insurgents on Oc-
tober 28, 1768, and Ulloa sought refuge on a frigate moored there
containing the colonial treasury, when, perhaps apocryphically,
the vessel's cable was cut by the rebels on November 1, 1768 and
Ulloa sailed on to Havana and made report of the insurrection.22
years preceding the cession, so it is not surprising that the French authorities rejected
the petitions to annul the cession. 2 GAYARRt, supra, at 71-73, 87-89, 163; J. MooRE,
REVOIT N LouIsriAA: THE SPANmISH OccuPATioN, 1766-1770, at 21-34 (1976). Du Terrage,
supra note 12, at 253, gives a summary of the petitions.
16. 2 GAYARRf, supra note 12, at 142-51.
17. Id. at 130-33.
1:3. Id. at 132.
19. Id. at 174-75. Ulloa drafted a decree abolishing the superior council and impos-
ing the Recopilaci6n de las Indias and the Spanish judicial system on the colony, which
was to have gone into effect at the formal taking of possession of Louisiana. Since there
was never a formal taking of possession by him at the capital, New Orleans, this decree
never took effect. MooRE, supra note 15, at 52-53.
21). 2 GAYARR9, supra note 12, at 185-86.
2L. Id. at 187-93.
22. Id. at 247-54.
[Vol. I11
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Because of the strategic importance of Louisiana, it was decided
to retake the colony for Spain.
For this purpose, the crown appointed a distinguished soldier,
Alejandro O'Reilly 23 on April 16, 1769, by royal cidula, which
gave O'Reilly wide discretion in establishing Spanish sovereignty
and putting down the rebellion by setting up the "military as well
as political administration of justice."' 2 After making the necessary
military preparations in Havana, O'Reilly's expedition arrived in
New Orleans on August 17, 1769.25 Shortly afterwards, O'Reilly
arrested the twelve leaders of the insurrection, who were tried and
found guilty. Five were executed, and the rest were sentenced to
varying terms of imprisonment.26
Pursuant to the instructions from the crown, O'Reilly's policy
was to integrate Louisiana into Spain's ultramarine domain in
America.27 O'Reilly recommended (and his government approved)
that Louisiana should be subject to the same laws as the other
Spanish colonies, that all judicial proceedings should be in Spanish,
and that a tribunal be set up of judges versed in both French
and Spanish law.2" On November 25, 1769, O'Reilly promulgated
23. See his biography in Bjork, supra note 12, at 127-28; du Terrage, supra note
12, at 302-03.
24. See the translation of the cedula in Bjork, supra note 12, at 129. The Spanish
text is in Batiza, La Unidad del Derecho Privado en Luisiana Durante El Regimen Epafiol,
4 INTER-Am. L. REv. 121, 125-26 (1962), and is translated by Professor Batiza in Batiza,
The Unity of Private Law in Louisiana Under the Spanish Rule, 4 INTER-AM. L. Rv.
139, 143-44 (1962).
25. Bjork, supra note 12, at 130-32.
26. 2 GAYARP9, supra note 12, at 340-50. These six were released from their prison in
Havana after one year of incarceration.
27. Bjork observes:
It was Spain's first intention, when occupying Louisiana, to make no innovation in
its forms of government, which was to be entirely independent of the laws and prac-
tices observed by other Spanish-American colonies. Louisiana was to be considered
a distinct colony, remaining under its own administration, council and other tribunals.
The direction of Louisiana and its correspondence was reserved to the minister of State.
Due, however, to the fatal results of this policy, O'Reilly was instructed to establish
"that form of government and administration of justice prescribed by our wise laws,
and by which all the states of his majesty in America have been maintained in the
most perfect tranquility, content, and subordination."
Bjork, supra note 12, at 150 (footnotes omitted; language in quotation marks from O'Reilly's
Instructions of November 25, 1769). See also 5 HIsToRIcAL MEMORmS OF LOUIsIANA, supra
note 13, at 25.
28. Bjork, supra note 12, at 151. Professor Hans Baade notes that the insurrectionists
were prosecuted and sentenced under provisions of Spanish law, and that O'Reilly ap-
proved these sentences on October 24, 1769 "segdin nuestras leyes." Baade, Marriage Con-
tracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in "Notarial" Jurisprudence, 52 TuL.
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his ordinances and instructions for the administration of justice
in Louisiana.29 Because Louisiana had no Spanish law books or
Spanish lawyers, these ordinances were partially stop-gap in nature,
and it was subsequently ordered by the Council of the Indies that
some copies of the digests (Recopilaci6n) of the laws of the
Indies, and of Castile, be sent to the colony, and deposited
among the archives of the ayuntamiento, in order that the natives
oil" the country may instruct themselves in the form of our
government, more minutely than they can from the manual [i.e.,
O'Reilly's instructions] drawn up, with such discretion, by the
said general, inasmuch as the latter, though very clearly and
methodically expressed, is only an abridgment or compendium. 0
These instructions are a paraphrastic summary of the Recop-
ilaci6n, the Nueva Recopilacidn (1567), and the Siete Partidas
(1343).31 The instructions were printed, and presumably distributed
broadcast, in French, and to military commandants of outlying
posts. 3
2
The instructions do not deviate from the Recopilacin, and,
as mentioned, served as a manual for practitioners and notaries
who were unacquainted with Spanish law," as is clear from the
preamble to the First Instructions:
L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1978). The abrogation of French law and Spanish law, imposed in its
stead, was necessary because of the legal background of some of the leaders of the
insurrection:
The heavy involvement of the French Louisiana legal "establishment" in the events
of October, 1768 must have made the suppression of the ancien droit in that Spanish
province a virtual certainty. French public law, including penal law, disappeared as
a result of O'Reilly's judgment of October 24, 1769 [approving the submission of the
prosecutor and sentencing the insurrectionists, which was based on "nuestras leyes."J.
Baade, supra, at 36 (footnote omitted).
29. See Bjork, supra note 12, at 155-65; Baade, Marriage Contracts, supra note 28,
at 37-39. See also Baade, The Formalities of Private Real Estate Transactions in Spanish
North America: A Report on Some Recent Discoveries, 38 LA. L. REv. 655, 682-84 (1978).
30. The Report to the King by the Council of the Indies, February 27, 1772, as set
out in 5 HisTomcAL MEmoms OF LOuISIANA, supra note 13, at 251.
3 1. Baade, Real Estate, supra note 28, at 682-83; Bjork, supra note 12, at 162-64.
32. Baade, Real Estate, supra note 28, at 683 n.115; Bjork, supra note 12, at 164 n.35.
33. The two sets of Instructions may be found in 5 HIsToicAL MEmoms OF Lot-
siANA, supra note 13, at 251-88 and Ancient Jurisprudence of Louisiana, I LA. L.J. 1-60
(Aug. 1841). This latter translation of the Instructions is footnoted as to the derivative
provisions of the Recopilacidn de las Indias. There are other translations made by Joseph
White in 1829 under a commission from the President. White's covering letter to Secretary
of State Henry Clay explains how he got involved in the area by being United States
commissioner for the adjudication of land titles under the Florida Treaty of 1819. 5
[Vol. I11
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Instructions as to the manner of instituting suits, civil and
criminal, and of pronouncing judgments in general, in conform-
ity to the laws of the Nueva Recopilaci6n de Castilla, and the
Recopilaci6n de las Indias, for the government of the judges
and parties pleading until a more general knowledge of the
Spanish language, and more extensive information upon those
laws may be acquired: digested and arranged by Doct. Don
Manuel Joseph de Urrustia, and the counsellor Don Felix Rey,
by order of his excellency Don Alexander O'Reilly, Governor
and Captain General of this province, by special commission
of His Majesty.34
Subsequent ordinances and regulations did not change the ap-
plicability of the totality of Spanish law, including the Recopilacidn,
to Louisiana. Thus, in 1797, Governor Gayoso issued instructions
for the distribution of lands.35 These instructions were obviously
supplementary to the more general Spanish legislation on the sub-
ject. The regulations of the Intendant Morales in 1794 were
similarly devised to take into account the peculiar settlement pat-
terns of the colony.3 6 Having established that O'Reilly brought
Spanish law with him, we turn to an examination of the
Recopilacidn de las Indias and its provisions governing Indians.
II. The Recopilacidn de las Indias
The Recopilacidn de las Indias was first published in 1680 by
Carlos II in order to gather together in one publication "muchas
C~dulas, Cartas, Provisiones, Ordenanzas, Instrucciones, Autos
de gobierno, y otros despachos que por la dilataci6n y distancias
de unas Provincias a otras no han llegado a noticia de nuestros
vasallos."" The Recopilacidn begins by decreeing that the laws
of metropolitan Spain be observed in all cases where no provi-
sion is made in the Recopilaci6n, but made clear, however, that
the laws specifically passed for America shall control, the law of
AmERiCAN STATE PAPEns-PuBuc LANDs 631-634 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1860). Further transla-
tions by White may be found in 6 AmmcAN STATE PAPERs-PuBLIC LANDs 703 (Gales
& Seaton ed. 1860) and 7 A1mEicAN STATE PAPERS-PUBLIC LANDs 564 (Gales & Seaton
ed. 1860). White collected these translations and published them under the title of Wmrnm's
NEw RECOPELACION (1839).
34. 1 LA. L.J., supra note 33, at 27-28.
35. 5 AmmIcAN STATE PAPERs-PuBLIC LANDs 730 (White tr. 1860).
36. Id. at 431.
37. RECOPILACION, supra note 6, 1, iii.
1983]
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metropolitan Spain notwithstanding.38 It devotes one of its books,
Book VI, to Indian relations, and a substantial number of other
provisions concerning Indians are scattered throughout. Before
reviewing this "Indian Code," however, it would be well to under-
stand the reformist impulses that brought it forth.
At the beginning of the European invasion and colonization
of the western hemisphere, a process initiated with the "discovery"
by Columbus in 1492, the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas
were regarded by some of the Europeans as a distinctly inferior
species of human being, if human beings at all.39 It is not surpris-
ing that thus perceived, the Indians were treated inhumanly by
the invaders. Specifically, Indians were enslaved and their labor
was exploited by the device of the encomienda, whereby Indians
were given or "commended" by the crown to Spaniards, called
encomenderos, who were given the right to compel labor and
tribute out of the Indians. 41 The encomenderos were obliged to
38. REcoPIiAcI6t, II, 1.2; II, 2.1 (The first citation is to Book II, title 1, Law 2 of
the Recopilacidn de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias].
39. Beginning with Christopher Columbus, the Indians were considered "deficient
in civilization according to Spanish standards of measurement." R. BERKHOFER, JR., THE
WIrE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT
11 (1978). Professor Berkhofer demonstrates how the narratives of Columbus and Amerigo
Vespucci set the tone for later European notions of Indians, and concludes:
Using the twin criteria of Christianity and "civilization," Spaniards found the Indian
wanting in a long list of attributes: letters, laws, government, clothing, arts, trade,
agriculture, marriage, morals, metal goods, and above all religion. Judgments upon
these failures might be kind and sympathetic or harsh and hostile, but no one argued
that the Indian was as good as the European in this early period ...
If the Aztecs, for example, possessed sophisticated governmental, agricultural, and
social systems, so too they practiced a religion that appeared to Spanish eyes as the
very worship of the Devil, with its emphasis on human sacrifice. Indians might, therefore,
have the wrong or no religion, have misguided or no government, in addition to other
negative qualities attributed to the stereotype, but they always stood in Christian error
and deficient in civilization, according to Spanish standards of measurement.
Under this impression, no wonder Spaniards debated what means were necessary
to bring the Indian in line with their ideals of Christian civilization according to Euro-
pean criteria. Was the nature of the Indian so bestial as to demand force and ulti-
mately enslavement to accomplish his conversion to Christ and Spanish ways, or was
the Indian sufficiently rational and human to achieve these goals through peace and
example alone?
Id. at 10-11. See also, in this connection, A. PAUDEN, THE FALL OF NATURAL MAN: THE
AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE ORIGINS OF COMPARATIVE ETHNOI.OOY 10-17 (1982).
40. On the encomienda, see generally S. ZAVALA, LA ENCOMIENDA INDIANA (2d ed.
1973); L. BYRD SIMPSON, THE ENCOMIENDA IN NEw SPAIN: FORCED NATIvE LABOR IN
THE SPANISH COLONIES 1492-1550 (1929).
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provide religious instruction to the Indians and to protect them, 41
but, in practice, the encomienda resulted in "almost unchecked
exploitation of the Indians, ' 4 2 and gave rise in turn to the first
protective legislation for the Indians: the Laws of Burgos, promul-
gated in 1512.41 The Laws of Burgos, however, proved unsatisfac-
tory, and the European exploitation under the encomienda system
continued unabated. Protests of the injustices began to be
widespread and the lead reformer-one may call him even a minor
prophet-was Bartolom6 de Las Casas, repentant encomendero,
Dominican friar, bishop of Chiapas, and polemicist." Early on,
Las Casas became a committed enemy of the encomienda, attemp-
ted unsuccessfully to have it abolished, and was one of the per-
sons who persuaded Pope Paul III to issue his bull, Sublimis Deus,
in 1537.41 The notion that Indians were not human beings was
anathematized in Sublimis Deus, and the Pope proclaimed that
Indians possessed human and civil rights that were to be respected:
Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by
Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or
the possession of their property, even though they be outside
the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely
and intelligently, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their
property; nor should they be in any way enslaved; should the
contrary happen it shall be null and of no effect."
Sublimis Deus did not stop the infamy of exploitation, but it gave
an important papal impetus and legitimacy to the reform move-
ment and the issuance of ameliorative legislation, the New Laws
41. See S. ZAVALA, DE ENCOMIENDAS Y PROPRIEDAD TERRITORIAL EN ALGUNAs
REGIONES DE LA AMERICA ESPAIfOLA 9-13 (1940); L. HANIc, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 19 (1965).
42. HANKE, STRUGGLE, supra note 41, at 20.
43. The best edition of the Laws of Burgos is Altamira, El Texto de las Leges de
Burgos de 1512, REv. DE HisT. DE A ERICA (No. 4, 5 Dic. 1938), and are summarized
in Byrd Simpson, supra note 40, at 50-55.
44. See GIMNiNEz FERNANDEz, FRAY BARTOLOMt DE LAS CASAS: A BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH, BARTOLOM8 DE LAS CASAS IN HISTORY-ToWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAN
AND HIS WORK 67 (J. Fried & B. Keen ed. 1971).
45. An English translation of the Sublimis Deus at L. HANKE, ALL MANKIND is ONE:
A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION BETWEEN BARTOLOMf DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN GINS DE
SEPOLVEDA IN 1550 ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN IN-
DIANS 21 (1974). Las Casas and another Dominican, Bernardino de Minaya, drew up peti-
tions to the Pope criticizing the Spanish colonial authorities' treatment of the Indians.
Gimdnez Fernandez, supra note 44, at 88-89; HANKE, ALL IANKuD, supra at 17-20.
46. Translated in HANKm, ALL MANKIND, supra note 45, at 21.
1983]
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of 1542, in the drafting of which Las Casas played a considerable
part.,7 The struggle between the exploiters and the indigenists came
to a head in 1550, when Las Casas debated Juan Gin6s de
Seplilveda at Valladolid.4 s Ginds de Sepfilveda, a theologian,
Aristotelian, and militarist, maintained that Indians, as pagans,
should be subjected to the Christian faith by force, if necessary, 9
and adopted the arguments of John Major, a Scottish theologian,
to that effect.5 0 Major and Gin6s de Sepfilveda advocated the view
that the political leaders of the Indians should be deprived of their
authority in order that their subjects accept the Christian faith,
and that these leaders should be deposed if they refused to accept
Christianity."' Las Casas sarcastically accused Major of ignorance
in matters of the New World's aborigines"2 and pointed out that
the polity of the Indians was entitled to be respected, including
the obedience of the subjects to their lords and the payment of
taxes." Las Casas maintained the legitimacy of Indian govern-
ment (in effect recognizing, in a prescient manner, the modern
concept of Indian tribal sovereignty) since the Indians had their
own government, their own laws, and the right to choose their
own leader, even though a previous leader had been deposed by
the Pope himself for a just cause." '
47. Republished in LAS LEYRs NuEVAS 1542-43 (A. Muro Orej6n, ed. 1946). See also
the summary of the New Laws in Byrd Simpson, supra note 40, at 150-53. Both Pro-
fessors Hanke and Byrd Simpson point to Las Casas as the spiritual godfather and in-
spirator of the New Laws and the supplementary legislation of 1543. Byrd Simpson, supra,
at 150; HANKE, STRuGGLE, supra note 42, at 91-95.
48. See generally HANKE, AL MANKIND, supra note 45, and Losada, The Controversy
between Sepdlveda and Las Casas in the Junta of Valladolid, in LAS CASAS IN HISTORY,
supra note 44.
49. See HAmNK, AL. MANKIND, supra note 45, at 69-70, 83-99, for Las Casas' rebut-
ta to Sepfflveda's arguments seeking to justify war against the Indians.
50. Id. at 118. Las Casas's polemic against Gin~s de Septilveda has recently been
translated into English. B. LAS CAsAs, IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANs-THE DEFENSE OF THE
MOST REvEREND LORD, DON FRAY BARTOLOMA DE LAS CASAS, OF THE ORDER OF PREAcHERS,
LATE BISHOP OF CHLPA, AoAwsT THE PERSECUTORs AND SLANDERERS OF THm NEw WORLD
DIsCOVERED AcRoss = SIAS (S. Poole tr. 1974).
51. LAS CASAS, supra, at 326-41; HAmmrn, ALL MANKIND, supra note 45, at 100-04.
52. LAS CAsAs, supra note 50, at 339-40.
53. Las Casas cites the admonition of Christ to render unto Caesar that which belongs
to him, as well as Saint Paul's command that Christians should be subject to their nonbeliev-
ing lawful authorities, including the payment of taxes. Id. at 331-52. He also invokes
Saint Thomas Aquinas to the effect that it is lawful for a nonbeliever to exercise judicial
power over a Christian. Id. at 333.
5.4. Id. at 337-38. One commentator has remarked that this position foreshadows
the modem concept of universal suffrage and a parliamentary system of democracy. See
Losada, La Apologia Obra Inedita de Fray Bartolomd de Las Casas: Actualidad de su
Contenido, 142 BOLETIN DE LA REAL AcADEMIA DE HISTORiA 201, 242 (1968).
[Vol. I11
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The second major point made by Las Casas in opposition to
Gin~s de Sepfilveda was related to the preceding argument as to
polity: the just title to the New World. Gin~s de Sepfilveda had
invoked the name of the theologian Francisco de Vitoria" as one
who approved of war against the Indians. But Las Casas pointed
out that, far from supporting Gin~s de Sepfilveda, Vitoria had,
rather, thoroughly destroyed a major prop of Gin~s de Sepfilveda's
argument-the "donation" to the Spanish king of the New World
by Pope Alexander VI in his bull, Inter Caetera of June, 1493.56
Vitoria resoundingly refuted the notion that Spanish title to the
New World could rest upon Inter Caetera, or even the right of
conquest, by noting the obvious fact that since neither the Pope
nor the Holy Roman Emperor (who was also the king of Spain),
had dominion over the whole world, neither person could give
away that over which he had no dominion, possession, or control, s7
and the refusal of the Indians to recognize this assertion of power
by the European potentates did not justify making war on the
former, forcing them to convert to Christianity or depriving them
of their property. 8
Vitoria did propose lawful titles to the New World, but Las
Casas observed that, in these arguments, Vitoria either spoke con-
ditionaly or assumed facts that did not exist. 9 In the main,
55. Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1492-1546), considered to be the founder of the modem
discipline of international law. See generally J. ScoTT, Tm SPANISH Oisom OF INTERNA-
TiONAL LAW-FRANCiSCO DE VORI AN His LAw OF NATIONS (1934); Cohen, The Spanish
Origin of Indian Rights in the United States, 31 GEo. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1942); L. Gmwno,
EL MAESTRO FRAY FRANcisCo DE VrrORIA (1930).
56. Regarding the Alexandrine Bulls of Donation, see S. ZAVALA, LAS INSTIrUCiONES
JURIDICAS EN LA CONQUISTA DE AMERICA, cap. III (2d ed. 1971); A. GARcIA-GALLO,
EsTuDIos DE HisroRIA DEL DmUcao INDIANo 432-46 (1972); P. CASTANEDA DELADO,
LA TEOCRACIA PONTIFICAL Y A CONQUISTA DE ANmRICA 253-57 (1968). See generally L.
WECKmAN, LAS ButLAs ALEJANDRINAS DE 1493 Y iA TEoRfA POLTICA DE PAPADO MEDIEVAL
(1949).
57. See F. DE VrroRiA, RELEcTIo DE INDIA o LIBERDAD DE LOS INDIoS 13-75 (L. Perefla
y J. Perez Prendez ed. 1967) (bilingual Latin and Spanish ed.); GARCIA-GALLO, supra
note 56, at 403-23.
58. DE VITORIA, supra note 57, at 98 n.60. See also HANKF, STRUGGLE, supra note 41,
at 151-51. See generally GARCIA-GALLO, supra note 56, at 425-71; LAS CASAS, supra note
50, at 340-41.
59. B. LAS CASAS, TRATADO COMPROBATORIO DEL IMPERIAL SOBERANO, II TRATADOS
DE FRAY BARTOLOM9 DE LAS CASAS 1066-69, 1174-81 (1965). See also HAN s, SRuooxm,
supra note 41, at 153-55. One "lawful title" of Vitoria is worthy of mention, the role
of the Spanish crown as guardian or trustee for the Indian principalities in assisting the
Indians with prefects, governors, and other governmental adjuncts, as long as it was for
the benefit of the Indians. DE VrroRiA, supra note 57, at 94-95. As will be seen infra,
the special governmental infrastructure created under the Recopilacidn de las Indias for
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however, Las Casas was in agreement with Vitoria: the Indians
should retain all their property, estates, and juridical powers, and
he accused the Spanish settlers of unlawfully taking away Indian
mines and lands."0
There is no question but that Las Casas and his band of
reformers and polemicists influenced the passage of further reform
legislation by the crown. The writings and activity of Vitoria, his
disciple, Domingo de Soto,61 Las Casas, and others was the im-
mediate impulse for the great reform ordinance of 1573, by Philip
II, -which eschewed mention of the word "conquest" and pro-
scribed all forceful means of "pacification" of Indians unless there
was an absolute need for them, and then only with as little harm
as possible.6" Indeed, the practical effect of the Great Valladolid
Debate of 1550 was that the royal c'dulas of the Council of the
Indies, which initiated reforms and protection for the Indians-
later incorporated into the Recopilacidn-were inspired by, and
were practical applications of, the philosophy of the reformers.
The themes sounded by Las Casas, Vitoria, de Soto and other
reformers can therefore be clearly seen in the Recopilacidn. To
begin with, there was the express disclaimer of title by conquest
in the 1573 Ordinance:
For suitable causes and considerations, it is proper that in all
the grants which are made out for new discoveries, the word
"conquest" be avoided, and in its place the words "pacifica-
tion" and "colonization" used. Since, desiring to act with all
peace and charity, it is our will, that this word, by being inter-
preted contrary to our intention, should not give opportunity
or excuse to the grantee to do violence or injury to the Indians. 6 13
Indians was a response to the guardian obligation envisaged by Vitoria. This has, in turn,
been reflected in United States legislation for the Indians because the federal government
has the duties of a trustee for its Indian wards. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974).
60. See HAIKE, AL. MANKIND, supra note 45, at 113-22. Las Casas did not, however,
succeed in the immediate accomplishment of his main political goal, that of having the
encomiendas abolished, but they did become less and less important for the colonialist
economy of the crown and were finally abolished in the eighteenth century.
61. As to Domingo de Soto, his contribution is discussed in V. CARuo, LA TEOLOorA
Y Los TEOLOGOs-JurISTAS ESPAF4OLES ANTE LA CONQUISTA DE AMRICA 523-37 (2d ed. 1951).
62. See J. MANzANo Y MANzANo, LA INCORPORACI6N DE LAS INDIAS A LA CORONA
DE CxsmELo 206-09 (1948); F. CHEVALIm, LA FORMACI6N DE LOS LATiFUNDIOS EN MaXICO-
TrRRA Y SOCIEDAD EN Los SIGLos XVI y XVII, at 234-56 (2d ed. 1976).
63. REcOPILACi6N, IV, 1.6:
El mismo, [Don Felipe, II] ordezianza 29 de poblaciones. Don Felipe, IV, en Madrid
d 11 de junio de 1621. Don Carlos, II y ]a reina gobernadora.
[Vol. I11
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It was further expressly recognized that the Indians had their
own governments, which had issued their own laws for their own
governance, and that this aboriginal legislation should be obeyed
dnd enforced:
We order and command that the laws and good customs which
the Indians anciently had for their good government and order,
and their usages and customs which they have observed and
kept since they became Christians, and which are not incom-
patible with our holy religion, or with the laws of this book,
as well as those which they have recently made and declared,
be kept and executed, and, it being necessary, by these presents
we approve and confirm them, together with what we are able
to add thereto that is useful to us and appears to us accordant
with the service of our Lord God, and our own, and the preser-
vation and Christian government of the natives of these pro-
vinces, without prejudice to what has already been done, and
their good and just customs and their own statutes."
In connection with this recognition of Indian government, Euro-
peans were forbidden to seize the property of Indians under the
pretext of taking sides in a dispute between Indians:
The discoverers by land or sea shall not involve themselves in
any war between certain Indians and others, nor foment nor
Que en las capitulaciones se excuse la palabra conquista, y usen las de pacificacion
y poblacion.
Por justas causas y consideractiones conviene, que en todas las capitulaciones que
se hicieren para nuevos descubrimientos, se excuse esta palabra conquista, y en su
lugar se use de las de pacificacion y poblacion, pues habiendose de hacer con toda
paz, y caridad, es nuestra voluntad, que aun este nombre, interpretado contra nuestra
intencion, no ocasione ni de colar a lo capitulado, para que se pueda hacer fuerza,
ni agravio d los Indios.
64. Id., II, 1.4:
El Emperador Don Cdrlos y la Princesa Doila Juana gobernadora en Valladolid, A
6 de Agosto de 1555.
Que se guarden las leyes que los indios tenian antiguamente para su gobierno, y
las que se hicieren de nuevo.
Ordenamos y mandamos, que las leyes y buenas costumbres que antiguamente tenian
los Indios para su buen gobierno y policia, y sus usos y costumbres observadas y guar-
dadas despues que son cristianos, y que no se encuentran con nuestra sagrada religion,
ni con las leyes de este libro, y las que han hecho y ordenado de nuevo se guarden
y ejecuten; y siendo necesario, por la presente las aprobamos y confirmamos, con
tanto que Nos podamos affadir lo que fueremos servido, y nos pareciere que conviene
al servicio de Dios nuestro Seflor, y al nuestro, y a la conservacion y policia christiana
de los naturales do aquellas provincias, no perjudicando A lo que tienen hecho, ni
A las buenas y justas costumbres y estatutos suyos.
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assist in any controversies, for any cause or reason whatsoever;
they shall do them no harm nor injury, nor take their prop-
erty, except by way of barter, or gifts made of their own free
will.6s
But there was an even stronger guarantee of due process:
We order and command the Governors, chiefs and new
discoverers, not to suffer or permit anyone to make war against
the Indians, except in the cases mentioned in the Title concern-
ing war, or to do them any other wrong or injury whatever,
or to take from them anything of their property, fortune, cattle
or crops, without payment in advance, and full satisfaction given,
provided that purchases and exchanges shall be of their own
free will and accord, and that punishment be inflicted upon
those who maltreat or injure them, in order that they may easily
come to a knowledge of our Holy Catholic Faith. 6"
Book VI of the Recopilaci6n is specifically devoted to Indian
affairs, and it begins by giving Indians certain preference rights:
Having to treat in this book the subject of the Indians, their
liberty, growth and protection, as is set forth in the titles of
which it is composed; it is our will to charge upon the viceroys,
Presidents and Audiencias, the duty of looking after them and
65. Id., IV, 1.10:
Don Felipe, II, Ordenanza 20 de poblaciones.
Que los descubridores no se embaracen en guerras ni bandos entre los Indios, ni
los hagan dafia, ni tomen cosa alguna.
Los descubridores por mar, 6 tierra, no se embaracen en guerra ninguna, entre unos
y otros Indios, ni los ayuden ni revuelvan en cuestiones por ninguna causa, ni raz6n
que sea: no les hagan mal, ni daflo ni tomen sus bienes si no fueren por rescate 6
dflndoselo eos por su libre voluntad.
66. Id., IV, 1.8:
El Emperador D. C~rlos, Ordenanza 8 de 1523.
Que no se consienta que a los Indios se les haga guerra, mul, ni dano, ni se les
tome cosa alguna sin paga.
Ordenamos y mandamos a los Gobernadores, Cabos, y nuevos descubridores, que
no consientan, ni permitan hacer guerra a los Indios, si no fuere en los casos expresados
en el titulo de la guerra, ni otro cualguier mal, ni dafto, ni que se les tome cosa ninguna
de sus bienes, hacienda, ganados, ni frutos, sin que primero se les pague, y de satisfac-
cion equivalente, procurando, que las compras, y rescates sean a su voluntad, y entera
libertad, y castiguen a los que les hicieren mal tratamiento, o daflo, para que con
facilidad vengan en conocimiento de nuestra Santa F6 catolica.
It is to be noted that this provision is superior to the due process guarantees in the fifth
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giving the proper commands, in order that they may be pro-
tected, favored and relieved, because we desire that the injuries
which they suffer be remedied, and that they may live without
molestation or annoyance; taking this charge as established once
for all, and having always before them the laws of this com-
pilation which favor and protect them, and defend them from
all injury whatsoever, that they observe them and cause them
to be observed with great care, punishing those who violate them
with special and rigorous severity; and we ask and charge upon
the ecclesiastical authorities that, for their part, they act as true
spiritual fathers of this new Christendom, and preserve all of
them in their privileges and prerogatives, and keep them in their
protection. 67
Paramount in the scheme of protection under the Spanish
colonial regime is the Indians' ownership of land. To begin with,
safeguards were set up to guard against the improvident sale of
Indian properties, real or personal, and at the same time, there
was an express recognition of the right of Indian ownership:
When the Indians sell their property, immovable and personal
movable, according to what is permitted to them, it shall be
proclaimed by public outcry and sold at public auction, in the
presence of a judicial officer-the immovable property for a
period of thirty days, and movable property for nine days; and
whatever shall be sold in any other way shall be of no validity
or effect; and if it shall seem proper to the judge for sufficient
reason to shorten the time, he can do so in regard to personal
property. And since the property which the Indians sell is or-
dinarily of small value and if in all of such sales it was necessary
67. Id., VI, 1.1:
Don Felipe, II, en Madrid, d 24 de diciembre de 1580. Don Carlos, II, y la reina
gobernadora.
Que los indios sean favorecidos, y anparados por las justicias eclesiasticas, y seculares.
Habiendo de tratar en este libro la materia de indios, su libertad, aumento, y alivio,
como se contiene en los titulos de que se ha formado: Es nuestra voluntad encargar
6 los virreyes, presidentes, y audiencias el cuidado de mirar por ellos y dar las ordenes
convenientes para que sean amparados, favorecidos, y sobrellevados, por lo que deseanos
que se remedien los dafios que padecen, y vivan sin molestia, ni vejacion, quedando
esto de una vez assentado, y teniendo muy presentes las leyes de esta Recopilacion,
que les favorecen, amparan, y defienden de cualesquier agravios, y que las guarden
y hagan guardar muy puntualmente, castigando con particular y rigurosa demostra-
cion d los transgresores. Y rogamos y encargamos a los Prelados eclesidsticos, que
por su parte Io procuren corno verdaderos padres espirituales de esta nueva cristian-
dad, y todos los conserven en sus privilegios y prerogativas, y tengan en su proteccion.
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to follow these formalities it would involve as much expense
as the principal amounts to, we order that this law be observed
and enforced, in regard to whatever exceeds thirty pesos of usual
gold, and not in smaller amounts; for in this case it will be
sufficient for the Indian vendor to appear before any ordinary
judge, and ask leave to make the sale; and such judge, ascer-
taining by some investigation that what he wishes to sell is his
own, and that its alienation is not injurious to him, shall give
him permission, placing his authorization upon the writing which
the purchaser shall execute, being of full age and having capacity
to that end.68
As a result of the efforts of the reformers, the main purpose
of Spanish Indian policy was that Indian settlements and lands
were to be separate and apart from those of Europeans. 9 The
68. Id., VI, 1.27.
69. The crown was firm in its protection of the Indians' property rights, both as
individuals and as groups. From 1503, through its instructions to Governor Ovando, it
endeavored to assure them that their lands would be sold to the Spanish at "fair" prices.
Allotting lands for the neighboring settlers of Spanish towns could only be carried out
in a manner that would not prejudice the Indians, in accordance with the colonizing or-
dinances of 1573.
Upon formulating the program of the reducciones, a decree of 1560, later codified,
ordered that the establishment of a reduccidn would in no way mean that the lands previously
possessed by the Indians would be taken from them. On the other hand, the reduccidn,
or Indian village, should be surrounded by a zone set aside for their fields and pastures.
This zone, which in New Spain was called the fundo legal, was, by its special nature,
inalienable. Viceroy Falces, in 1567, fixed its area at 500 varas [one vara = 2.8 feet].
As Francois Chevalier says, "in a country somewhat mountainous, dry and poor, that
general minimum ... seems very paltry for allowing a community to live independently."
In 1637, the fundo legal was increased to 600 varas, beginning at the last house of the
village, and then in 1695, from the church. Other ranches could not be established less
than 1,100 varas from an Indian village. The ordinances of Alfaro in 1618, which at that
time were directed to a scarcely populated region, or rather, to the provinces of the Rio
de la Plata, ordered that new reducciones have a "common" one league long for their
livestock, that is, some six thousand varas. Livestock ranches could not be located less
than one league from an already existing Indian village and three leagues from a new
reduccidn. This precept was included in the 1680 Recopilacidn. The area reserved for In-
dian resettlement was established to be one league square, but the grazing boundary was
two leagues. Whatever interpretation is given to the extension of the inalienable Indian
lands, the crown, foreseeing any kind of eventuality, ordered in the 1570s that no sale
of Indian possessions be made without judicial permission, a precept which was later in-
corporated into the Recopilacin. In New Spain, at least, an ordinance in 1619 required
that the leasing of Indian lands be accorded the same legal precautions in effect for sales
of Indian lands. Finally, in the 1640s, in connection with the sale and settlement of lands,
the monarch decreed that vacant and unoccupied lands be reserved for the Indians and
that lands irrigated or improved by them "in no case" be sold or taken away.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol11/iss1/2
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legislative expression of this policy is found in the provision that
Indians would be willing to
be brought into settlements more willingly and more quickly
if their lands and farm-buildings are not taken from them in
those areas [in] which they no longer reside. We ordain that there
be no change in this, and that the Indians possess in the same
manner as before in order that they may cultivate and improve
these properties."0
Non-Indians were prohibited from residing or even passing through
Indian villages.7 European livestock was to be separated by an
extensive protective zone, at least one league square, in which the
livestock of the Indians was to have exclusive rights of pasturage:
The locations where Indian villages and Indian reserves are to
be placed shall have sufficient water rights, sufficient farmland
and uncultivated fertile land, and shall be provided with en-
trances and exits, land suitable for cultivation and enough
common land for pasturage of at least one league in extent,
in order that the cattle of the Indians be not intermingled with
those of the Spanish.72
This entire series of legal provisions was based on a logical and consistent philosophy.
No one expresses better than the Viceroy Toledo the methods that this agrarian policy
dictated: "The Indian policy of this kingdom consists of their holding lands as property
. . . and their labor creates a spiritual good in that they are not idle and that they are
able to pay their taxes to their communities. . ." Thus, the common good of the kingdom
was linked at the same time to the religious good of the poor Indian laborer. It would
be anachronistic to see in this mixed motivation a hypercritical cynicism. Fear of idleness
and the belief in the salutary advantages related to growing crops were concepts deeply
rooted since medieval times. M. MORNER, LA CORONA ESPAqOLA Y LOS FoRANEos EN LOS
PUEBLOS DE INDIOS 168-69 (J. Hoxie tr. 1970).
70. RECOPILATi6N VI, 3.9:
Don Felipe, II, en Toledo, a 19 de Febrero de 1560.
Que a los Indios reducidos no se quiten las tierras, que antes hubieren tenido.
Con mds voluntad y prontitud se reducirdn a poblaciones los Indios, si no se les
quitan las tierras y granjerias que tuvieren en los sitios que dejaren: Mandamos que
en esto no se haga novedad, y se les conserven como las hubieren tenido antes, para
que los cultiven, y traten de su aprovechamiento.
See also id., VI, 1.23 (Ordinance of Philip III, 1609). This last provision shows a recogni-
tion by the crown that some Indians were not provided with enough land of their own,
so that they could supplement their subsistence by taking time off from the encomienda
to farm their own individual and communal lands.
71. Id., VI, 3.21. The evolution of this provision is analyzed in MORNER, supra note
69, at 125-28. See also RECOPILACI6N VI, 9.14, and the discussion in MORNER, supra at
129-31.
72. RECOPILACION VI, 3.8:
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Not only was this physical and economic separation necessary for
the protection of the Indians, it was also important for the colonial
economy. The Indians were to be the laborers and producers of
crops and the colonial authorities desired to replicate feudalism
in the New World, with the Indians as serfs."
This separatist policy is consistently expressed throughout the
Recopilaci6n. Thus, no land granted to a Spanish settler would
be in prejudice to any rights of Indians, and if there be such a
conflict, the Indians were to be restored to possession and
ownership. 74 Indian land was inalienable, and royal officials were
to see to it that the rights of the Indians were protected. 7" An
individual Indian could not sell tribal land, 76 and an Indian had
a preference right to purchase vacant lands."
To see that these provisions were enforced, royal protectors
were appointed, 7 and the viceroy was to be informed of the con-
Don Felipe, II, en el Pardo a 10 de Diciembre de 1573.
Don Felipe, III, en Madrid at 10 de Octubre de 1618.
Que las reducciones se hagan con las calidades de esta fey.
Los sitios en que se han de formar pueblos, y reducciones, tengan comodidad de
arguas, tierras y montes, entradas y salidas, y labranzas, y un exido una legua de
largo, donde los indios puedan tener sus ganados, sin que se resuelvan conotros de
espafholes.
See the discussion, infra, concerning this provision and id., VI, 3.9 in the text, infra,
at notes 160-164.
73. Finally, it must be emphasized that the purpose of the mother country in protect-
ing the indigenous ownership of the lands, and similarly in preventing cohabitation with
foreigners, must be linked with the economic structure of the colony itself. The Indians
were the laborers, and the authorities were vitally interested that they produce in quan-
tities sufficient for the colonial society. Further, the stockbreeding of the Spanish earned
them respect, and the ranchers, from that time on, were known to exercise a constant
influence over the authorities, somewhat similar to that of sheep ranchers in Spain. The
exclusion of Indians as owners of large livestock was as consistent with the policy of
the crown as its simultaneous limitation on the expansion of the Spanish ranches to the
benefit of the Indian croplands. The requirement that such a ranch be established at a
distance of at least a thousand varas, or according to the Recopilacidn, at least one league
from an Indian village, was supported by this last motive. That is, the dualism as to
residence and ownership of lands had its complement in an economic system also of a
dualistic character which enjoyed the approval of the mother country. MORNER, supra
note 69, at 171. See also RECOPILACION IV, 12.12.
74. RECOPILACI6N IV, 12.12.
7:5. Id., IV, 12.17; VI, 21.1.
76. Id., VI, 2.11.
77. Id., VI, 12.19.
73. An entire chapter of Book VI of the Recopilaci6n de las Indias, title 6, sets out
the duties of these royal protectors. The role and function of thefiscal real has a somewhat
reduced analogue in the Indian law of the United States. Under 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1976),
United States attorneys in the various states and territories are charged with the legal
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ditions of the Indians by high church officials and visiting judges."
The fiscal real, or king's attorney, of the royal audiencia, was
appointed to represent the Indians should they be involved in
litigation. 0 The visiting (or circuit) judges were charged with deter-
mining if European livestockmen were using Indian lands to the
detriment of Indians and were empowered summarily to expel the
encroachers.8 1 The fiscal real was to be notified each time real
property was conveyed and was charged with the duty of in-
vestigating the sale or grant to see whether it would affect any
Indians . 2 The fiscal real was to set aside all royal grants or
homesteads if the land had belonged to the Indians and had been
illegally sold to a European. 3 These royal grants or homesteads,
called composiciones, were to be offered to the Indians on a
preferential basis.8"
This, then, was the body of law brought to the somewhat un-
willing colony of Louisiana by General O'Reilly in 1769. As has
been seen, his regulations were a broad summary of the law of
colonial Spain and were promulgated until such time as Spanish
lawyers and law books could be brought to the colony to serve
the legal needs of the population. Later on, when the Intendant
Juan Ventura Morales issued regulations governing the issuance
of land grants, the Recopilacidn was cited as authority that only
vacant lands should be granted, 5 and it was specifically provided
that "[t]he Indians owning land throughout the whole of this
Government, shall not be disturbed, but, on the contrary, shall
representation of reservation Indians. However, Indians may sue in their own behalf, Poaf-
pybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 370-72 (1968), especially in those cases where
there may be a conflict of interest. E.g., New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1107
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977);
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Cir.) supplemented 360
F. Supp. 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Pyramid Lake Tribe, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
awarding of attorney's fees against the federal government, even though the private counsel
were successful in vindicating an important interest of the tribe that the government had
failed to protect in its role as a fiduciary. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 499
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
79. RECOPILACifN, VI, 10.7, 21.
80. Id., II, 18.36.
81. Id., II, 31.13.
82. Id., IV, 12.16 (Charles V and Empress Regent, Feb. 27, 1531; Philip III, Dec.
14, 1615, June 17, 1617).
83. Id., IV, 12.17 (Philip IV, June 30, 1646).
84. Id., IV, 12.10 (Philip IV, June 30, 1646).
85. Article 24 of the Regulations of the Intendant Morales, citing id., IV. 12.15.
3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERs-PUBLiC LANDs, at 434 (J. White tr. 1860).
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be maintained and supported: and the commandants, syndics, and
surveyors, shall pay the strictest attention to it, in order to make
their reports in consequence thereof." 6
When the United States land commissioners reviewed the prac-
tices of the former Spanish colonial land officials regarding In-
dian land holdings, it was found that the Indians held original
title., superior to that of the crown and protected by the crown.
After noting that the Spanish authorities divided the Indians into
two categories, Christian Indians, who had rights identical with
those of Spanish subjects, "and the ordinary tribes or natives of
Indians within the limits of Louisiana," 87 the commissioners,
quoting former Spanish officials familiar with the legal tenure of
the Indian tribes, said:
"We always considered the title from the Indians to their villages
the best of titles, because the original property of the soil was
in them; and when this country was conquered, the laws of
the conquerors were enforced, but the property of the aborigines
was held sacred. Hence the difference between the titles of In-
dians and other subjects. The other subjects who wanted land
must demand and have a written title. It was not necessary for
the Indians, because they already had a title to the land they
claimed. Their title originated in, first, occupancy, cultivation,
and settlement. The Indians never claimed other lands than their
villages, and when they did, it was given them by the Govern-
ment. There never was an instance of the Government of Spain
taking land from Indians, especially their villages. Even when
the Indians had abandoned some villages, because their hunt-
ing was exhausted, and had established new ones, by the grant
of the Spanish Government their deserted villages were always
considered as their property, subject to their disposal, and the
inhabitants never suffered to settle there, but were always driven
off.
"There was no time fixed in which a deed must be presented
for approbation. It could be presented in one year, or a hun-
dred years, and it would receive the sanction of the Govern-
ment. The laws made it necessary when the Indians sold their
86. Article 31 of the Regulations of the Intendant Morales. 3 AMERIcAN STATE PAPERS-
Puauc LANs, at 435. See also Article 32 of the Regulations, id.
87. Report of Board of Land Commissioners, Western District of Louisiana, April
6, 1815, 3 Ammuc~A STATE PAPERS, at 86.
[Vol. I11
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol11/iss1/2
LIGHT OF DEAD STARS
lands to have the deeds presented to the governor for approba-
tion. This was only a form, as the governor in all cases ap-
proved, and never refused.
"The villages of the Indians never consisted of less than a
league, and often two leagues or more in front; and it was the
custom of the Spanish Government, whenever they granted land
to Indians, to give them a league or more square .... "
The lands claimed by the Indians around their villages, were
always considered as their own, and they were always protected
in the unmolested enjoyment of it by the Government against
all the world, and has always passed from one generation to
another, so long as it was possessed by them as their own prop-
erty. The Indians could always sell their land with the consent
of the Government; and if, after selling their village and the
lands around it, they should, by the permission of the Govern-
ment, establish themselves elsewhere, they might again sell, hav-
ing first obtained the permission of the Government, and so on,
as often as such permission was obtained; and no instance is
known where such permission has ever been refused or withheld..
These sales were passed before the commandant of the district,
and was always considered good and valid without any order
from the Government."8
The commissioners later opined that the quoted statements as
to the paramountcy of Indian title and its nondefeasibility without
viceregal sanction were not heterodoxy. However, as has been seen,
it was, of course, the commissioners, not former Commandant
De Blanc or Surveyor Trudeau whose assertions were unorthodox.
It has been shown that the Indians did not relinquish their lands
if they were moved to another village site and that the league square
for a grazing common was the minimum zone of protection around
an Indian village. The commissioners were probably unversed in
Spanish law, and, in any event, their arguments in favor of their
position are not supported by any citation or reference but rest
upon a shaky framework of casuistry and vague inference. It is
significant, moreover, that the commissioners knew of only three
government-approved sales of Indian lands during the Spanish
domination. This is proof of the observance of the protective laws,
rather than the latitudinarianism, if not noncompliance, which
the commissioners seem to deduce from the historical record.
88. Id. at 94-95 (emphasis in original).
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What seems to horrify the commissioners the most is De Blanc's
assertion that Indian title is the best of all titles by virtue of their
being the aboriginal inhabitants of the country. The commissioners
do not argue so much that this aboriginal title never existed, but
that it was extinguished by adverse possession or prescription by
the European settlers. Yet it has already been seen that the Euro-
peans could not usurp or prejudice Indian land holdings or real
property rights. Rather than an Indian title being extinguished
by prescription, the Indian could maintain prescriptive rights even
against the crown by virtue of the doctrine of justa prescripci6n.
It is that doctrine, "one of the profoundest factors in human
thought," 9 which now must be examined.
III. Justa Prescripci6n
In view of the cruelty and genocidal character of the Spanish
occupation of the Americas, it is hard not to be cynical about
the laws passed to protect the Indians. It may be said that many
of these laws were never observed and that many more were obeyed
in the breach. Some would say that the imperial decree that for-
bade use of the word "conquest" and required that the term
"pacification" be used instead9 ° is similar to the same ugly
euphemism used during the Vietnam War to describe napalming
villages at random and defoliating large tracts of forest with car-
cinogenic Agent Orange. An examination of the historical record
will show, however, that at least some of the cynicism is mis-
placed. The protective laws did mitigate, even when they did not
succeed in prohibiting, harm. That the use of "pacification" and
the disapproval of "conquest" was more than just a semantic
dodge can be seen in the decrees that led to the adoption of the
doctrine of justa prescripci6n.
During the latter part of the sixteenth century, Indian popula-
tion began to decline, and Indian villages and landholdings were
snatched up by the European settlers.' Because of this economic
and demographic decline and in order to protect the interest of
the crown and to preserve the landholdings of the decimated and
almost liquidated Indian tribes, a series of decrees were passed
89. Cariflo v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449, 459 (1909)
(Holmes, J.).
90. See supra note 63.
91. F. de Solano, El Regimen de Tierras y las Composici6n de 1591, IV CONORESO
DEL IbisTrrTo INTERNACIONAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHo INDuNo 649, 653 (1976).
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that established a regular cadastral scheme for recording and pre-
serving interests in land.92 These decrees culminated in this codifica-
tion in the Recopilaci6n:
Whereas we have completely succeeded to the lord-ship of the
Indies; and the farms, dwelling-places, and lands which have
not been granted by their Majesties the Kings our predecessors,
or by us, or in our name, belong to our patrimony and royal
crown; and it is appropriate that all the land which is possessed
92. Professor M6rner describes the situation:
The Crown's mechanisms for protecting Indian land rights accorded well with its policy
of residential separation. The risks would be very great that foreigners settling among
the Indian villages would end up taking the Indians' lands from them. On the other
hand, the fact of acquiring land within an Indian village could, obviously, induce the
buyer to make residence there himself. It would likewise increase the difficulty of carry-
ing out the legally ordained expulsion of the outsiders, because their interest in re-
maining there would be greater.
Toward the middle of the 17th century, the demographic curve of the Indian popula-
tion reached its nadir. At the same time, the population of the Spanish in the cities
increased. It was natural that, since the Indian lands were left uncultivated, many
foreigners were attracted to the villages, desirous of appropriating the lands. It was
necessary, then, that the mother country declare that the prohibition on foreigners
dwelling among the Indians was also valid in cases where they had acquired lands
in the Indians' villages. As we have indicated before, the corresponding decree of 1646
should, above all, be understood within the context of the complex of influences of
certain absent landlords residing in Spain. But at the same time, it shed light upon
the desires of the natives themselves. There is, for example, a petition from the Indian
governor of Jangolgui, in the Audiencia of Quito in 1639, which describes the diffi-
culty of carrying out the expulsion of the foreigners, including those who had acquired
land in Indian villages. At the same time, since 1591, the crucial process of the settle-
ment and sale of unclaimed lands, motivated by the Crown's financial crisis, necessarily
constituted a more serious danger than any to the Indians' claims to their lands. The
anxiety, or bad conscience, of the Crown, finds an elegant expression in the repeated
prohibitions contained in the Recopilaci6n of 1680 against taking land from the In-
dians in the course of the settlement, and the prohibition of land sales from the In-
dians themselves.
The communal ownership of lands in an Indian village would be confirmed by some
land grant or other indisputable title. But often, the natives lacked such explicit titles.
In such a way, the decrees prohibiting the residence of foreigners in the said villages
would be able to be invoked by the Indians, with the object of recovering lands usurped
by foreigners. What was in substance a right to protection of their persons, was to
be used in defense of their property rights. As Jose Miranda emphasized, indigenous
communal ownership, of strong pre-columbian roots as much in New Spain as in Peru,
was documented by three institutionalized factors: the existence of ancient Indian
customs, the retention of an autonomous municipal government and the policy of
residential separation.
MORNER, supra note 69, at 170-71.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
ev
[Vol. 11
without just and true titles be restored to us, in manner and
form as it belongs to us; we order that, reserving in the first
place whatever may appear necessary to us; or to the Viceroys,
Audiencias and Governors for public squares, ways, commons,
pastures and farms, in the places and villages which have been
colonized, as well for what is suitable for their present state,
as for the future, and the growth which they may make, and
allotting to the Indians what they fairly need to cultivate and
make their plantations and gardens confirming them in what
they have now, and giving them further what is necessary, all
the rest of the land may be and shall remain free and unen-
cumbered in order to grant freely and dispose of at our will
and of our own bounty. Therefore, we order and command
the Viceroys and Presidents of pretorian Courts, that when it
seems proper to them, they appoint a suitable term within which
the possessors shall exhibit to them and the officers of their
Councils whom they may appoint, their grants of lands, farms,
plantations and manors, and confirming those who hold with
good grants and assurances or by just prescription, that the rest
be returned and restored to us to dispose of at our will. 3
'his enactment followed past Spanish law, as well as Roman
law. The Siete Partidas had provided that while certain kinds of
93. RECOPILACI6N, IV, 12.14:
Don Felipe, II, en 20 de noviembre de 1578. Y A 8 de marzo de 1589. Y en el Pardo,
d I de noviembre de 1591.
Que d los poseedores de tierras, estancias charcras y caballerfas con legitimos tftulos,
.re les ampare; en posesion, y las demas sean restituidas al rey. Por haber Nos sucedido
enteramente en el sefiorio de las Indias, y pertenecer d nuestro patrimonio y corona
real los valdios, suelos y tierras que no estuvieren concedidos por los sefores reyes
nuestros predecesores, 6 por Nos, 6 en nuestro nombre, conviene que toda la tierra
que se posee sin justos y verdaderos tftulos, se nos restituya, segun y como nos pertenece,
para que reservando ante todas cosas lo que d Nos, 6 A los virreyes, audiencias y
:governadores pareciere necesario para plazas, exidos, propios, pastos y valdfos de los
lugares y concejos que estan poblados, asi por lo que toca al estado presente en que
se hallan, como al porvenir, y al aumento que pueden tener, y repartiendo A los indios
lo que buenamente hubieren menester para labrar y hacer sus sementeras y crianzas,
,onfirnmAndoles en lo que ahora tienen, y ddndoles de nuevo lo necesario, toda la demas
fierra quede y est6 libre y desembarazada para hacer merced, y disponer de ella a
nuestra voluntad.
Por todo lo cual ordenamos y mandamos A los virreyes y presidentes de audiencias
pretoriales, que cuando les pareciere sefialen t6riino competente para que los poseedores
exhiban ante ellos, y los ministros de sus audiencias, que nombraren, los tftulos de
tierras, estancias, chacras y caballerias; y amparando A los que con buenos titulos y
recaudos 6 justa prescripcion poseyeren, se nos vuelvan y restituvay las demas, para
disponer de elias a nuestra voluntad.
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property in actual public use, such as streets, squares, parks, and
the like, were imprescriptible, other species of government prop-
erty could be obtained by forty years' prescription.94 The Novfsima
Recopilacidn allowed the acquisition of royal property through
proof of immemorial possession.95 The Code of Justinian also
provided for a forty-year prescription, good against the state. 96
Indeed, the provision extended to ultramarine Spain the settled
law of metropolitan Spain regarding prescriptive rights against
the crown. It is quite clear that this provision expressly recog-
nized that Indians would likely not be in possession of documents
of title (con buenos titulos), and it explicitly confirms the prop-
erty holdings already in possession of the Indians (confirmandoles
en lo que a hora tienen). The crown thus recognized that the In-
dians held under their own laws and customs, 97 and that nothing,
not the papal donation, not discovery nor conquest, vitiated these
titles. Since their title was based upon immemorial possession,
Indians obviously could not exhibit their buenos titulos to the royal
officials; the provision quite clearly absolves them of this duty.9
Moreover, the provision explicitly places holdings under Indian
customary law on an equal footing with royal grants.
When the provision is read in context with other portions of
the Recopilacin protecting Indian land holdings, what emerges
is an unequivocal recognition of Indian property rights, a pro-
phylaxis against usurpation, and a recognition of the Indian govern-
mental structures that had created and still guarded them. Even
the specious argument of the Louisiana federal land commissioners
that, somehow, the Indians lost their property rights by prescrip-
tion acknowledges, as a premise, that there were valid, existing
rights and interests in land which had to have been "lost." 9
94. See SamTE PARTiAs, Partida 3, Titulo 29, Ley 7. See also Partida 3, Titulo 29,
Leyes 18, 21.
95. In Allard v. Lobau, 3 Mart, (N.S.) 293, 300 (La. 1825), the Louisiana Supreme
Court applied this provision to hold that "[plossession cannot be pleaded against a public
right unless it has been immemorial. Novissima Recop., Lib 11, titl. 8. Ley 4."
96. See CODEX JUsTRANIS VII, 27.1; VII, 38.2; VII, 39.4; VII, 39.6.
97. See RECOPILACION, II, 1.4, requiring that Indian customary law be observed, supra
note 64.
98. There is nothing in Recopilacidn, IV, 12.14 which would have prohibited an In-
dian from putting on record evidence of immemorial possession, and thus acquire an ad-
ditional assurance of ownership, but the provision quite clearly does not require this.
99. While there is no provision in the Recopilacidn de las Indias that explicitly says
that Indian property rights are imprescriptible, it is difficult to see how prescriptive rights
can be acquired, or even exist in an inchoate state, in the light of provisions such as
Recopilacidn VI, 3.9, allowing reservation Indians to retain ownership of previously owned
19831
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Finally, the provision was reaffirmed by a royal cddula of 1754,
which provided that when persons could not produce a paper title,
"their proof of long possession shall be held as a title by
prescription.""'
Against this background, it can be seen that the Spanish crown
had not extinguished aboriginal title; it did not claim to have ex-
tinguished it; and, in those cases where Spanish officials moved
Indians from one place to another,"0 ' the former Indian lands were
not automatically divested of aboriginal title.102 Thus, at the time
of the change of sovereignties, there were extensive Indian holdings
in Louisiana, though not all of them were evidenced by paper title.
IV. Spanish Law Under the American Flag
The territory of Louisiana was retroceded to France by the
Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800, but Spanish colonial officials
continued to administer the colony until it was purchased by the
United States in 1803 ' 3 The laws of Spain, including the
Recopilacidn, were therefore in force at the time Louisiana was
purchased by the United States. 4
Before ratification of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty, President
Jefferson had sent a set of questions to a prominent New Orleans
merchant, Daniel Clark, inquiring, inter alia, as to the legal system
in operation within the Louisiana Territory. 05 In his answers, Clark
lands; Recopilacidn VI, 1.30, forbidding an encomiendero to succeed to the lands of deceased
Indians; Recopilaci6n IV, 12.5, .7, .9 that royal land grants shall be made without pre-
judice to Indians and allowing the Indians to retain their own landholdings with suitable
water rights; Recopilaci6n IV, 12.17, .18, that land grants not be made of land which
had beeil illegally obtained from Indians; and Recopilaci6n IV, 12.19, that Indians be
given preference rights for land grants. Recopilacidn IV, 12.18 specifically recognizes that
the Indian lands will be left to Indian rulers and governmental leaders.
10). Royal Regulation of Oct. 15, 1754, 5 Am. STATE PAPERs-PUDLIc LANDS, at 656.
101. As to the Spanish policy of making Indian tribes buffer states for their colonial
territories, see O'Callaghan, An Indian Removal Policy in Spanish Louisiana, in GREATER
AwMRICA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HEREERT EUGENE BOLTON 281 (1945).
102. See RECoPILACiON VI, 3.9, supra note 70.
103. See E. LYON, LOUISIANA IN FRENCH DIPLOMACY, 1759-1804, at 116-26, 167-75,
231-45 (1934); A. WHITAKER, THE Mississippi QuESTION, 1795-1803, at 183-204 (1934).
104. See Brown, Law and Government in the Louisiana Purchase, 2 WAYNE L. REv.
169 (1956); Franklin, The Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish Medieval
Law from Louisiana, 16 TuiL. L. REv. 319 (1942).
105. 9 Tan TERRIToRAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS
3-4 (C. Carter, ed. 1940) (letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor Claiborne, July 17,
1803). Jefferson had enclosed a copy of his questions to Clark in a letter to Governor
Claiborne of the Mississippi Territory informing him of the Louisiana Purchase.
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gave an accurate account of the system of laws prevailing in the
territory:
NO. 16. Whence is their code of laws derived, a copy of it if
in print.
Ansr The Code of laws is derived from the Recopilaci6n de In-
dias, & Leyes de Castilla & les uses & Coutumes de Paris for
what respects usages & Customs,
The Marquis de Yrujo, & John Vaughan of Philadelphia had
copies of the Spanish Laws,-the French uses & Coutumes may
I presume be easily found among the Book-sellers in the United
States, they are not to be had here.-
Query N0 . 21. What is the nature of their criminal Jurispru-
dence, number & nature of Crimes & Punishments.
Answer. For an answer to this Question I refer to the small
work on the subject herewith which treats of it more clearly
and concisely than all I had got written by the Lawyers respect-
ing it. For further information I refer to the Leyes de Castilla
& Recopilaci6n de Indias on which this little Work is founded.'
In his answer to Query No. 21, the "small work" to which Clark
was referring was a copy of the O'Reilly Ordinances."7
President Jefferson used Clark's information in drawing up a
document which, under the title "An Account of Louisiana," he
transmitted to Congress on November 14, 1803.108 The "Account"
contained this paragraph:
OF THE LAWS
When the country was first ceded to Spain, she preserved many
of the French regulations; but by almost imperceptible degrees,
they have disappeared; and at present the province is governed
entirely by the laws of Spain and the ordinances formed ex-
pressly for the colony. Various ordinances promulgated by
General O'Reilly, its first Governor under Spain, as well as some
other laws, are translated and annexed in the Appendix, No. 1.109
106. Id., at 35, 38 (letter from Daniel Clark to James Madison, Sept. 8, 1803).
107. The copy of O'Reilly's Ordinances which accompanied Clark's letter is in French,
id. at 38 n.48, and was translated in the appendix to Jefferson's "Account of Louisiana."
108. 1 AivmucAN STATE PAPERs-MiscEL&NEous, at 344.
109. Id. at 351. The appendix referred to in the quotation is set out id. at 363-81,
and contains the two sets of ordinances by O'Reilly and the Police Regulations of June
1, 1795 by Governor Carondelet.
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Even though, as has been seen, the abrogation of French law
and its supplanting by Spanish law can hardly be said to have
been "imperceptible," and although O'Reilly was not the first
governor of Spanish Louisiana, it is clear that Jefferson was cor-
rect that the municipal law of the newly acquired territory was
that of Spain.
In the special session called to ratify the Purchase Treaty and
to appropriate money for the purchase," I Congress passed an act
enabling the President to take possession and vesting
all the military, civil and judicial powers, exercised by officers
of the existing government of the [territory] ... in such person
or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the Presi-
dent of the United States shall direct for maintaining and pro-
tecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of
their liberty, property and religion. "'
The :President appointed William C. C. Claiborne, the governor
of the Mississippi Territory, as governor of Louisiana, authoriz-
ing him "to exercise within the ceded territories all the powers
and authorities heretofore exercised by the Governor and Inten-
dent thereof .... 112
In his first proclamation as governor on December 20, 1803,
Governor Claiborne assured the inhabitants that "they shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and the religion which they profess; that all laws and
municipal regulations, which were in existence at the cessation
of the late Government, [shall] remain in full force ... "I"
After the United States took possession of Louisiana, Congress
passed an organic act in March, 1804, which divided the purchased
territory into the Territory of Orleans and the District of Loui-
siana. 1" The act extended many federal statutory provisions to
the territory, including the Indian Trade and Nonintercourse Act."I5
Under section 11 of the 1804 Organic Act, all laws in the ter-
ritory that were in force at the time of the purchase were to "con-
110. See 2 Aamc~A STATE PAPERs-FoREIGN RELATIONS, at 506 (President Jefferson's
Message to the Senate, Oct. 17, 1803).
111. Act of Oct. 31, 1803, ch. 1, § 2, 2 Stat. 245.
112. ORLEANS TERRrroRY, supra note 105, at 143.
113. 2 AMEUCAN STATE PAPERs-FOREIGN RELATIONS, at 582.
114. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283.
115. The then current version of the Indian Trade and Nonintercourse Act was the
Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139, which was extended to the Louisiana Territory
by § 15 of the 1804 Organic Act., 2 Stat. 289.
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tinue in force, until altered, modified, or repealed by the legisla-
ture.," I6
Acting under the 1804 Organic Act, the Legislative Council of
the Territory, in its joint resolution of February 4, 1805, appointed
a committee "to draught and report a civil and criminal code for
the said territory . . . [and] to employ two counsellors of law
to assist them in draughting the said codes . . . ," appropriating
$5,000 for the "counsellors at law so employed, for their
services. " 17
A second organic act governing the Louisiana Purchase Ter-
ritory was passed on March 2, 1805.111 This statute extended the
provisions of the Northwest Ordinance of 178711"9 to the Loui-
siana Purchase Territory. Under the ordinance, the three-judge
territorial judiciary was to conduct "judicial proceedings accord-
ing to the course of common law.""'2 However, section 5 of the
1805 Organic Act preserved the law of descent and distribution
in the Territory of Orleans. 2' Moreover, the statute authorized
the continuance of laws in force until altered or revoked by the
territorial legislature.' 22 The legislative assembly was thus em-
powered to alter, amend, or repeal these general laws under the
grant of power conferred by the ordinance. '23
116. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283, 286.
117. Orleans Territory Legislative Council Acts, 1st Sess. 1805, at 458-59.
118. Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, 2 Stat. 322.
119. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 had reenacted the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 under the Constitution. See J. EBLEN, THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES
EM:Pns: GovERoRs Arm TERoRiAL GOVERNMENT, 1784-1912, at 90 (1968).
120. 1 Stat. 52 n.(a). Section I of the Organic Act of 1805 provides that "the in-
habitants of the territory of Orleans shall be entitled to and enjoy all the rights, privileges
and advantages secured by the said ordinance, and now enjoyed by the people of the
Mississippi territory." 2 Stat. 322. This means that the Indian inhabitants of the Territory
of Orleans were entitled, under article III of the Ordinance, to "[t]he utmost good faith
being always observed towards them," and it was guaranteed that "their land and prop-
erty shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights
and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed. . . ." 1 Stat. 52 n.(a).
121. 2 Stat. 322 § 5. "And be it further enacted, that the second paragraph of the
said ordinance, which regulates the descent and distribution of estates . . . [is] excluded
from all operation within the said territory of Orleans." 1 Stat. 52 n.(a). Article II of
the Ordinance guarantees, inter alia, that the inhabitants of the territory would be entitled
to "trial by jury" and "judicial proceedings according to the course of common law."
122. 2 Stat. 322 § 5. "And be it further enacted, that the laws in force in the said
territory, at the commencement of this act, and not inconsistent with the provisions thereof,
shall continue in force, until altered, modified, or repealed by the legislature."
2 Stat. 286 § 11 provided: "The law in force in the said territory, at the commencement
of this act, and not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, shall continue in force, until
altered, modified, or repealed by the legislature."
123. 1 Stat. 52 n.(a). "[Tihe governor, legislative council, and house of representatives,
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Before the territorial legislature got around to performing its
duty under the 1805 Organic Act to "make laws, in all cases,
for the good government of the district," 124 Judge John S. Prevost
(a stepson of Aaron Burr) of the Territorial Supreme Court ruled,
in an. opinion which, unfortunately, has been lost, that the law
in force within the Territory of Orleans was the civil law of
Spain. 2 '
At the first session of the First Legislature held under the 1805
Organic Act, James Brown and Louis Moreau-Lislet were ap-
pointed "to'compile and prepare, jointly, a Civil Code for the
use of this Territory."' 2 6 The Territorial Legislature also passed
an act declaring that the salvo provisions of the 1804 and 1805
organic acts carried forward
the laws which remain in force, and those which can be re-
curred to as authorities in the tribunals of this Territory are
the laws and authorities following, to wit: ... 2. 0 The Spanish
law, consisting of the books of the recopilation de Castilla and
autos acordados being nine books in the whole; the seven parts
or partidas of the king Don Alphonse the learned, and the eight
books of the royal statue (fueroreal) of Castilla; the recopila-
tion de indias, save what is therein relative to the enfranchise-
ment of Slaves, the laws de Toro, and finally the ordinances
and royal orders and decrees, which have been formally ap-
plied to the colony of Louisiana ... .
Governor Claiborne, however, perfunctorily vetoed this act on
May 22, 1806.121
It was not until 1808 that the Territorial Legislature approved
of the labors of Brown and Moreau-Lislet by enacting their work
as positive law. The statute makes it clear that the work being
shall have authority to make laws, in all cases, for the good government of the district,
not repugnant to the pr'nciples and articles in this ordinance established and declared."
124. Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, 2 Stat. 322.
125. The ruling is paraphrased and discussed in G. DARoo, JErraasoN's LOUISIANA:
PoLITIcs AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADmoNs, 132 nn.16-17 (1975); W. HATCHER, ED-
WAr, LiviNGsToN: JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRAT 118-19 (1940);
Dart, The Influence of the Ancient Laws of Spain on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana,
6 TuL. L. Rnv. 83, 84-85 (1931).
126. Orleans Territory, 1st Legis., Ist Sess. 1806, at 214 (1807).
127. Franklin, supra note 104, at 323-26.
128. The terse veto message is in 3 Or itCAL LETTERBOOKS OF W.C.C. CLAIBORNE,
1801-1816 (D. Rowland ed. 1917), at 313. Governor Claiborne gave curt and somewhat
unsatisfactory reasons for this veto in two letters dated May 26, 1806 to James Madison
and Julien Poydras. Id. at 309-11, 314-16.
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approved was not a comprehensive enactment of the civil laws
to be in force in the territory, but a digest.' 29
Until 1808 the judiciary had considered Spanish law to be con-
trolling. Thus, in the second reported case before the Territorial
Superior Court, Judge Lewis acknowledged that "the law of Spain
... is to form the rule of decision in this case,"' 30 and so applied
it. But even after the promulgation of the 1808 Digest, the courts
continued to apply Spanish law, deeming it to be still in opera-
tion and the 1808 Digest to be merely a summary of the entire
corpus of Spanish law. The character of the Digest was so defined
in the 1812 decision of Hayes v. Berwick: "What we call the Civil
Code is but a digest of the civil law, which regulated this country
under the French and Spanish monarchs."' 31 A few years later,
in Beard v. Poydras, 32 Judge Derbigny used the historical record
to reject a claim that the French code noir was still in force; it
was there held that Spanish law had completely supplanted wordy
aspects of French law. 33 Finally, in Cottin v. Cottin, 34 Judge
Derbigny again applied the Recopilacidn de Castilla to govern
whether a child who died after seven or eight hours of life could
inherit:
In Spain, however, the laws of which were, and have continued
to be ours, where not repealed, there exists a particular disposi-
tion, by which it is further required, that the child, in order
to be considered as naturally born, and not abortive, should
live twenty-four hours. Is that law still in force among us, or
is it virtually repealed by the expressions used in our civil code,
in relation to this subject? . . .
It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest
of the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it
was adopted; that those laws must be considered as untouched,
wherever the alterations and amendments, introduced in the
digest, do not reach them; and that such parts of those laws
only are repealed, as are either contrary to, or incompatible
with the provisions of the code.
35
129. Act of Mar. 31, 1808, Orleans Territory, 2d Legis., 1st Sess., ch. 29, at 120.
130. Caiserques v. Dujarreau, 1 Mart. 7, 11 (Orleans 1809).
131. 2 Mart. 138, 140 (Orleans 1812).
132. 4 Mart. 348 (La. 1816).
133. Id. at 366-68.
134. 5 Mart. 93 (La. 1817).
135. Id. at 94.
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The jurisconsults who considered the question were unanimous
that the 1808 Digest was only a partial codification of the law
of Spain that was in effect at the time of cession to the United
States.' It was obvious that the Digest would have to be revised
and augmented, since the brooding omnipresence of Spanish law
and the scarcity of Spanish law books made for much uncertainty.
The legislature again addressed itself to the problem.
By its resolution of March 14, 1822,' 3" the legislature author-
ized a revision to be done by Moreau-Lislet, Edward Livingston,
and Pierre Derbigny. In their report to the legislature a year later,
the three revisers stated that their purpose was to prepare a com-
plete civil code in order to relieve the courts "in every instance,
from the necessity of examining into Spanish statutes, ordinances
and uses.'" s After some revisions, the legislature promulgated
the Civil Code in 1824, pending its final revision and printing,
and the Code was finally adopted in 1825.1'"
With 3,522 articles, the 1825 Civil Code had half as many ar-
ticles as had the 1808 Digest. The penultimate article of the Code
provided:
From and after the promulgation of this Code, the Spanish,
Roman and French laws, which were in force in this State when
Louisiana was ceded to the United States, and the acts of the
Legislative Council, of the legislature of the Territory of Orleans,
and of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, be and are
hereby repealed in every case, for which it has been especially
provided in this Code, and that they shall not be invoked as
laws, even under the pretence that their provisions are not con-
trary or repugnant to those of this Code.
40
But in two decisions after promulgation of the 1825 Civil Code,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the new code did not repeal
any preexisting law unless the latter was contrary to the former;'
4 '
136. See I L. MOREAu-LISLET & H. CARLETON, THE LAW OF LAS SaTE PARTIDAS xviii-
xxiii (1820).
137. Resolution of Mar. 14, 1822, La. Acts. 1822, at 108-09.
138. Preliminary Report of the Code Commissioners, Feb. 13, 1823, in 1 LA. LEOAL
AacHvs, lxxxv (1937).
139. Act of Apr. 12, 1824, § 7, La. Acts. 1824, at 176-77. By § 4 of the Act of Feb.
16, 1825, La. Acts. 1824-1825, at 128-31, the printer was given six additional months
to complete the Civil Code.
140. This provision has no counterpart in the last revision of the Louisiana Civil Code
in 1870.
141. Flower v. Griffith, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 89 (La. 1827); Lacroix v. Coquet, 5 Mart. (n.s.),
527, 527 (La. 1827).
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in other words, only laws that were directly contrary or repug-
nant to express provisions of the 1825 Civil Code were deemed
to have been repealed by article 3521 of that Code.
The legislature reacted to these decisions in its next session.
In Act No. 83 of 1828, it provided that "all the civil laws which
were in force before the promulgation of the Civil Code lately
promulgated, be and are hereby abrogated."'
'4 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court had the last word. In its 1839
decision in Reynolds v. Swain,' 3 the supreme court construed
whether a previous decision made by it applying the principles
of Roman law was binding on it, in view of the repealing provi-
sions in article 3521 and Act No. 83 of 1828:
The repeal spoken of in the code, and the act of 1828, cannot
extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself had enacted;
for it is this alone which it may repeal; eodem modo quiquit
constitutur, eodem modo dissolvitur.
The civil or municipal law, that is, the rule by which par-
ticular districts, communities, or nations are governed, being
thus defined by Justinian-"jus civile est quod quisqui sibi
populus constituit." 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 44. This is
necessarily confined to positive or written law. It cannot be ex-
tended to those unwritten laws which do not derive their author-
ity from the positive institution of any people, as the revealed
law, the natural law, the law of nations, the law of peace and
war, and those laws which are founded in those relations of
justice that existed in the nature of things, antecedent to any
positive precept.
We, therefore, conclude, that the Spanish, Roman, and
French civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are the positive,
written, or statute laws of those nations, and of this state; and
142. Section 25 of Act No. 83 of Mar. 25, 1828, La. Acts. 1828, at 160, provides, in full:
And be it further enacted, that all the rules of proceeding which existed in this state
before the promulgation of the code of practice, except those relative to juries, recusa-
tion of judges and other officers and of witnesses, and with respect to the competency
of the latter, be and are hereby abrogated; and that all the civil laws which were in
force before the promulgation of the civil code lately promulgated, be and are hereby
abrogated, except so much of title tenth of the old civil code as is embraced in its
third chapter, which treats of the dissolution of communities or corporations.
It can be seen that the repealing provision was inserted in § 25 almost as a kind of after-
thought, as Act No. 83 mainly addresses itself to making technical amendments to the
Code of Practice. Another act passed the same session repealed the 1808 Digest. Act No.
40 of Mar. 12, 1828, La. Acts. 1828, at 66.
143. 13 La. 193 (1839).
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only such as were introductory of a new rule, and not those
which were merely declaratory-that the legislature did not in-
tend to abrogate those principles of law which had been estab-
lished or settled by the decisions of courts of justice.'
Several years later, in Hubgh v. New Orleans & -Carrollton
Railroad,'45 the Louisiana Supreme Court made it clear that it
regarded settled principles of Spanish law, even if they had not
been the subject of definitive judicial declaration, as surviving the
1828 act and article 3521. The case was an action for wrongful
death, and the court concluded:
We can find nothing in the laws of Spain which authorizes this
action, or which presupposes any such right of action to exist,
and are satisfied that, as a general rule under both systems [i.e.,
Roman law and Spanish law], actions for injuries to the person
are strictly personal; and that there is no recognized principle,
in either, in which the plaintiff's action can be maintained.' 4
This is still the law in Louisiana; as late as 1927, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reaffirmed both Hubgh and Reynolds in Moulin
v. Monteleone.'4'
Using the Reynolds-Hubgh criterion, are provisions of Spanish
colonial law in the Recopilacidn de las Indias and other Spanish
legislation "established," "settled" principles of law, "founded
in those relations of justice" existing "in the nature of things"?
There is a line of cases that recognize the transcendence of the
principles laid down by the Recopilacidn. The most important,
and thus deserving of extended quotation, is the 1854 decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Chouteau v.
Molony,148 where the Court endorsed the protection afforded by
the Recopilacidn: "Spain, at all times, or from a very early date,
acknowledged the Indians' rights of occupancy in these lands, but
at no time were they permitted to sell without the consent of the
king." ' 9 The Court then reviewed the provisions of the Recop-
ilacidn de las Indias:
144. Id. at 197-98. The author speculates that Judge Martin may have been dissatisfied
with the offhand manner in which the repeal was expressed in § 25 of Act No. 83 of 1828.
145. 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851).
146. Id. at 511 (on rehearing).
147. 165 La. 169, 178-84, 115 So. 447, 441-53 (1927). The case concerned an action
for alienation of affections.
148. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 203 (1854).
149. Id. at 229.
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It is fact in the case, that the Indian title to the country had
not been extinguished by Spain, and that Spain had not the
right of occupancy. The Indians had the right to continue it
as long as they pleased, or to sell out parts of it-the sale being
made conformably to the laws of Spain, and being afterwards
confirmed by the king or his representative, the Governor of
Louisiana. Without such conformity and confirmation no one
could, lawfully, take possession of lands under an Indian sale.
We know it was frequently done, but always with the expecta-
tion that the sale would be confirmed, and that until it was,
the purchaser would have the benefit of the forbearance, of the
government. We are now speaking of Indian lands, such as these
were, and not of those portions of land which were assigned
to the Christian Indians for villages and residences, where the
Indian occupancy had been abandoned by them, or where it
had been yielded to the king by treaty. Such sales did not need
ratification by the governor, if they were passed before the
proper Spanish officer, and put upon record.
The Indians within the Spanish dominions, whether chris-
tianized or not, were considered in a state of tutelage. In the
Recopilacikn de las Leyes de las Indias, a part of the official
oath of the Spanish governors was, that they would look to
the welfare, augmentation, and preservation of the Indians.
(Book 5, c. 2.) Again: Indians although of age, continue to
enjoy the rights of minors, to avoid contracts or other sales
of their property-particularly real-made without authority of
the judiciary or the intervention of their legal protectors. (Soler-
zanos Politica Indians, 1, 209, §§ 204, 42) Indians are considered
as persons under legal disability, and their protectors stand in
the light of guardians. (46,51) The fiscal in the audiencia were
their protectors, but in some cases they had special protectors.
When Indians dispose of their landed property or other thing
of value, the sale is void unless made by the intervention of
the authorities, or of the protector general, or person designated
for the purpose. (C. 29, 42) Many other citations of a like kind
might be given from the king's ordinances for the protection
of the Indians. They were protected very much by similar laws
when Louisiana was a French province excepting in this: that
the power to confirm an Indian sale of land, as to the whole
or a part of it, or to reject it altogether, was exercised by the
French governors of the province. 150
150. Id. at 237-39.
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Justice Wayne's summary of the facts is in exact accordance with
the account presented above, that the Recopilacidn de las Indias
became the law of Louisiana upon O'Reilly's taking possession
of Louisiana, and that his ordinances were supplementary to, rather
than superseding, the Recopilacidn. The ratification of an Indian
sale by the governor was subject to laws made for the protection
of the Indians. These laws were no novelty; many, if not most
of them, were more than two hundred years old at the time Spain
acquired Louisiana, and they therefore fit the Reynolds-Hubgh
criterion of settled and established laws, laws "founded in those
relations of justice that existed in the nature of things," laws that
were not "introductory of a new rule," laws that were "declara-
tory" of the rights of Indians. And Reynolds also excepted laws
that were "settled by decisions of courts of justice." Beside
Chouteau v. Molony, there are a number of decisions by the Loui-
siana Supreme Court regarding Indian rights that fit under this
rubric.
The first of these is Reboul v. Nero,'"' decided in 1818, before
the promulgation of the 1825 Code and the 1828 repealer. There,
a defendant in an action for ejectment had purchased the land
from the Chitimacha Indians in a sale duly ratified by the col-
onial government. The question concerned the extent of the land
sold:
The manner of locating the lands assigned to the Indians was
not by fixing their boundaries by actual survey. They obtained
permission from the government to settle on a certain spot; and
round that spot they were by law entitled to possess an extent
of one league. Recop. de Ind. 6, 3, 8.'
2
In Miartin v. Johnson,'5 decided the same year, the Recopilacidn
was again invoked as the basis of the Indians' title. 4 Spencer's
Heirs v. Grimball,'S. decided in 1827, was a case arising out of
the Bayou Boeuf area of Rapides Parish, the subject of the Miller-
Fulton claims.' 6 It was argued that the Indians could not sell
151. 5 Mart. 490 (La. 1818).
152. Id. at 492.
153. 5 Mart. 655 (La. 1818).
154. See id. at 658-59, 660.
155. 6 Mart. (n.s.) 355 (La. 1827).
156. See 3 AmEicAN STATE PAPERs-PUBLIC LANDS, at 86 (Duff Green ed. 1834); J.
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land, but the court, citing Reboul and Martin v. Johnson, held
otherwise, since the Indians
were in every respect as completely owners of it [the soil] as
those who hold under a complete grant, although being con-
sidered in a state of pupilage, the authority of the public of-
ficers who were constituted their guardians, was necessary to
a valid alienation of their property.
But it is contended that no right was shown in the Indians
to settle in one part of the country, and after settling there to
move off and place themselves on other portions of the do-
main, and dispose of that too, as soon as a real or fancied
necessity or caprice might urge them to such a measure. That
the Spanish laws did not confer on them any such privilege,
and that the exercise of it would have been incompatible with
complete sovereignty over the soil, because in this way the whole
right of the nation in it might be lost. This objection appears
to us of little weight when considered in relation to the laws
and the policy of the country by which its validity must be tested.
Spain appears to have felt earlier than any other European na-
tion the wrongs inflicted on the original inhabitants of this con-
tinent, and her legislation bears repeated and anxious marks
of her desire to repair the injuries her ambition and cupidity
had occasioned. Whether she was defeated or not in this laudable
purpose, by the neglect of her agents, cannot affect the argu-
ment in a court of justice. Her indulgence to those tribes of
Indians who survived the conquest; her liberality, or rather justice
in allotting to them particular portions of the soil she has wrested
from them, and her care to make these acquisitions of value,
by preventing the intrusion of white settlers, are proved by
various laws, passed at different times, for the government of
her colonies in America. One of these laws meets the very ob-
jection taken in this case, and directs that when the Indians
give up their lands to the whites, other shall be assigned to them.
Porque a los Indios se habren de sefialar y dar tierras, y aguas,
y montes, si se quitaren a Espahioles, se las dara justa recompensa
en otra parte. Recop. de law Ind. liv. 6, tit. 3, leg. 14. It is
true this law does not specify in what mode the Indians must
abandon, to enable them to enjoy this advantage; it cannot
however, be presumed it was in the contemplation of the govern-
ment to permit them to make donations of their lands to the
Spanish settlers.' 7
157. 6 Mart. (n.s.) 355, 357 (La. 1827). The paraphrase of Recopilacin VI, 3.14 is
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The court then considered the extent of the land purchased.
Miller and Fulton had purchased the land in dispute from three
tribes, the Choctaw, the Pascagoula, and the Biloxi, in "pro-
ceedings [which] exhibit a great deal of that looseness and ir-
regularity which characterize the acts of the Spanish officers in
Louisiana.""15 The court, significantly, added:
Both the commandant and the governor seem to have been ig-
norant, or if not ignorant of, to have entirely disregarded the
laws of the Indies, which limit the quantity of land each tribe
was entitled to; for the space assigned to the Pascagoulas and
Biloxis far exceeds that which under the most liberal constitu-
tion of those laws they should have received ...
[Plaintiffs] have contended that by the local usages existing
in Louisiana, the Indians were entitled to more than a league;
and the evidence they offer of these usages is, the assent of
the governor to a sale, by which much more was sold by one
tribe. Respect is certainly due to the official acts of the officers
of the former. government, and in the absence of proof to the
contrary we should be inclined to consider them prima facie
correct. But in relation to the subject matter before us, we have
the law itself, which clearly limits the quantity to which In-
dians were entitled.1 59
The provision of the Recopilaci6n1" referred to does not limit
the quantity of land to which Indians are entitled, but, as has
been seen, places a limitation on the Spanish settler of a distance
of at least a league square from the Indians for the grazing of
incorrect. It says, rather, that the Spanish shall be compensated for any lands taken from
them to form a reduccion, i.e., a reservation for the Indians:
Y porque a los indios se habran de seilalar y dar tierras, aguas y montes, si se quitaren
a espafioles, se les dara justa recompensa in otra parte, y en tal caso formaran una
junta con das o tres ministros de ]a audiencia, parce que si algunos se agraviaren,
los oijan en apelaci6n, y hagan reparar al daflo, sobre que inhibimos a nuestras
audiencias.
In English:
The Indians will therefore have to show the lands, waters, and mountains taken. from
the Spanish, for which Spanish settlers will be given just compensation in some other
place, in which case they are to meet with two or three members of the audiencia
to whom they will present, if necessary, their grievances on appeal so that any pro-
hibited damages will be recompensed by the audiencia. (October 20, 1598).
158. 6 Mart. (n.s.) 355, 365-66 (La. 1827).
159. Id. at 366-67.
160. RECOPILAC16N VI, 3.8. See supra text at note 72.
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livestock. It is ironic how the provision is inverted to state a limita-
tion on ownership, especially when its literal terms clearly mean
otherwise. The phrase un exido de una legua de largo means, literal-
ly, "a common of one league in extent." This should be kept
in mind in considering Maes v. Gillard's Heirs,'6" decided a year
after Spencer's Heirs. The land in dispute had originally been pur-
chased from the Pascagoula Indians. Here, as in Spencer's Heirs,
there was a controversy as to the extent of land purchased:
These expressions of "a common of one league in extent," are
given in Spanish by the following "un exido de una legua de
largo," and though the true meaning is not quite free from
doubt, it does not appear to us that they support the construc-
tion of a league in extent, round the village in every direction.
Nothing of there being a league round the village, is said in
the law. The common is to be of a league in extent. And by
giving a league in every direction, there would be a common
of two leagues in extent at every point of the compass.
This construction is somewhat opposed to the reasons given
in the law of granting land to the Indians. The avowed object
is, to prevent their flocks mixing with those of the Spaniards.
And that object would certainly be better attained by granting
them a league in every direction from their village. But other
provisions of the laws of Indians deprive this argument of a
great deal, if not all of its force. By them Spaniards are pro-
hibited from placing their flocks of large animals (ganado mayor)
within a league and a half of the ancient Indian settlements,
and their flocks of smaller animals (ganado menor) within half
a league. In regard to the new settlements, the prohibition ex-
tends to double this distance. These restrictions rendered it un-
necessary to give the Indians the extent of a league in every
direction round their villages for their cattle. The appellants
have, however, relied on these laws, to show that the Indians
were entitled to all the lands on which the Spaniards could not
pasture their flocks. But nothing, in our judgment, can be more
unfounded than this pretension, for it would make the quan-
tity of soil which it is supposed was given to the Indians when
they were settled by the government, depend on the kind of
cattle the white men approached them with.
If it was a ganado mayor, they had a league and a half in
extent around them; but if a ganado menor was brought near
161. 7 Mart. (n.s.) 314 (La. 1828).
19831
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
them, their right diminished to half a league from their village.
These laws were evidently political regulations, for the better
preserving harmony among the different races of men who
formed the population of these colonies, and for the protec-
tion of that race on which they had inflicted so much injury,
when they first discovered and settled the country. Recopila-
cion de las Indias, liv. 5 titl. 21, law 12; ibid., liv. 7, titl. 3,
law 20.162
Here again, the court made a confusion. The provision limiting
estancias, or cattle ranches,' 63 is to be read in conjunction with
the league-square ejido limitation on European settlers; indeed,
they are part of the same decree of Philip II, on October 10, 1618.
Reading these provisions together, they mean that the ejido, which
must be at least one league in extent, should not have a cattle
ranch within a league, or a sheep or goat ranch within a half-
league, from the ejido.
It should be emphasized that these cases did not involve Indian
possessory rights; rather, they concerned the extent of land con-
veyed by the Indians in these questionable transactions. It will
be remembered that the Court in Spencer's Heirs referred to the
"looseness and irregularity" of these transactions and that the
officials seemed either "ignorant, or if not ignorant of, to have
entirely disregarded the laws of the Indies." The court seems to
162. Id. at 324-26.
163. RECOPILACION, VI, 3.20:
Don Felipe III alli d 10 de octubre de 1618.
Don Carlos II y Ia reina gobernadora.
Que cerca las reducciones no haya estancias de ganado.
Ordenamos, que las estancias de ganado mayor no se puedan situar dentro de legua
y media de las reducciones antiguas, y las de ganado menor media legua: y en las
reducciones que de nuevo se hicieren haya de ser el t~rmino dos veces tanto, pena
de perdida Ia estancia y mitad del ganado que en ella hubiere, y todas los dueflos
le tengan con buena guarda, pena de pagar el dafho que hicieren: y los indios puedan
matar el ganado que entrare en su teirra sin pena alguna, y en todo sea guardada
]a ley 12, tit. 12, lib. 4.
In English:
We order that cattle ranches shall not be located within a league and a half from
older Indian settlements, and small livestock shall not be grazed within a half league;
in newer Indian settlements, the distance shall be twice, and the penalty shall be the
lo:;s of the ranch and half of the livestock; all owners shall take care to observe this,
otherwise they shall have to pay for damages thus caused; the Indians may kill the
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have realized that there must have been, at the very least, over-
reaching and probably fraud in the land-claims proceedings after
the Purchase, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that this was
going on under the Spanish regime;'64 indeed, the Miller-Fulton
claims lend substance to this supposition.
V. Of Ockham's Razor, Monads, and the Igorot's Ranch:
The Survivability of Original Indian Title Under
American Sovereignty
Although under Chouteau, and Reboul and its progeny, there
can be no doubt that Indian ownership can be a valid link in the
claim of title, what about Indian title that has not been extin-
guished? This question is all the more important because there
is a notion abroad that Indian title is of a derivative nature, and
that Indian occupancy and possession under such title is no better
than tenancy at sufferance, or, at best, tenancy at will. Chouteau
teaches that the Spanish sovereignty over Louisiana did not ex-
tinguish the Indian title already existing under the French.
Moreover, although French policy in this respect is far from clear,
there does not seem to be any legal framework for the extinguish-
ment of Indian title, and the policy seemed to be that of incor-
poration of the Indians into the kingdom with the full rights of
other French subjects. 6 5 There is no basis to the notion that the
previous French sovereignty had, ipso facto, extinguished aboriginal
title, because (1) the regulation of the Intendant Morales specifically
invoked the protections of Spanish law for Indian property in-
terests, something which would not have been done had Indian
landholdings been canceled by the French authorities, and (2) there
was some assiduity by the Spanish colonial officials to protect
Indians against their own improvidence, as noted later on by the
United States land commissioners.' 1
6
Thus, Indian title not extinguished according to Spanish law
and regulation was full and valid under Spain in 1800. It was
certainly not extinguished by the French sovereignty from 1800
to 1803, since Spanish law remained in force until the next change
164. There is a discussion of this fraud and a recognition that it was going on during
the Spanish regime and the 1800-1803 Spanish-administered French possession in H. Coles,
"A History of the Administration of Federal Land Policies and Land Tenure in Loui-
siana, 1803-1860," at 54-55, 71-73, 127-220 (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt U., 1949).
165. See Thomas, Introduction, in INDAIr LAND CEssIo Ns IN Tm UNrrED STATES, com-
piled by C. Royce, 18th ANN. RP. BUREAU Am. ETIiNOLOGY (Part 2), 545-49 (1899).
166. See text supra at note 88.
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in sovereignty to the United States, effective on December 20,
1803., when the United States came into possession of the Loui-
siana Territory. At this point, three pertinent provisions of the
Louisiana Purchase Treaty came into effect. The first concerned
public property in the territory: "Art. II. In the cession made
by the preceding article are included the adjacent islands belong-
ing to Louisiana, all public lots and squares, vacant lands, and
all public buildings, fortifications, barracks, and other edifices
which are not private property."'" 7 Despite the change in sover-
eignty, article III of the treaty guaranteed private property:
Art. III. The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incor-
porated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon
as possible, according to the principles of the Federal constitu-
tion, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and im-
munities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime,
they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment
of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.'6 8
This provision quite clearly applies to everyone; it does not restrict
itself to citizens, or subjects, or even permanent residents, but
says, broadly, that the "inhabitants of the ceded territory" in-
cluding "Indians not taxed," "shall be guaranteed the free en-
joyment" of their property. "Property" is to be given a most
liberal interpretation; all species of property, and interests in prop-
erty, inchoate as well as complete, are protected.' 9
167. 8 Stat. 202. The French text is the definitive one, since the signatories to the
Treaty "declarant n6anmoins que le pr6sent trait6 a dt6 redig6 at arr&6 en langue Fran-
caise," 8 Stat. 205, and provides:
ART. II. Dans ]a cession faite par l'article precedent, sont compris les isles adjacentes
de-pendantes de la Louisiane, les emplacemens et places publiques, les terreins vacans,
tous les batimens publics, fortifications, cazemes et autres 6difices qui ne sont la propridt6
d'aucun individu.
8 Stat. 203. Because of this provision, it became necessary later on for the United
States to convey the Cabildo in New Orleans to the State of Louisiana, since that
building, by virtue of Article II, was federal property.
See Act of Apr. 29, 1812, ch. 73, 6 Stat. 108, and Mayor of New Orleans v. United
State:, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736-37 (1836).
168. 8 Stat. 202. The French text:
ART. III. Les habitans des territoires c~d6s seront incorpor~s dans l'union des Etats-
Unis, et admis, aussit6t qu'il sera possible, d' apr~s les principes de la constitution
f~d6rale a Ia jouissance des tous les droits, advantages et immunit6s des citoyens des
Etats-Unis, et en attendant, ils seront maintenus et prot6g~s dans le jouissance de leurs
libert~s, propri6t6s, et dans l'exercice des religions qu'ils professent.
169. See Soulard v. United States, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 512 (1830).
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The last provision is specifically directed toward Indians, and
shows that the United States considered Indian tribes to possess
a form of sovereignty: "Art. VI. The United States promised
to execute such treaties and articles as may have been agreed be-
tween Spain and the tribes and nations of Indians, until, by mutual
consent of the United States and the said tribes or nations, other
suitable articles shall have been agreed upon." ''70 The United States
thus pledged to continue the protection of the Indians as they
had been protected under Spanish rule. There were many treaties
entered into between Spain and various Indian tribes 7 ' and, under
article VI, Spanish treaties with the United States.7 " In one sense,
article VI is surplusage because Indian property rights were already
protected by article III's general guarantee of property rights. But
even if one admits the untenable assumption that article III ap-
plies only to non-Indian property rights, article VI guards the rights
of Indians as guaranteed by express agreements between them and
the Spanish crown, or arising out of the operation of the
Recopilacidn and other protective regulations.
It can therefore be concluded that not only did the United States
not extinguish Indian titles upon its purchase of the Louisiana
Territory, but it agreed, generally in article III and specifically
in article VI, to protect them. What, then, is the present status
of aboriginal title in this area? The answer to this question re-
quires an examination of the concept of original Indian title.
The fountainhead of the teaching on Indian title is Johnson
& Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh,'" a unanimous 1823 decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, authored by Chief
Justice Marshall. M'Intosh was an action in ejectment, brought
in federal district court under diversity of citizenship, where plain-
tiffs claimed under purchases from two Indian tribes."' Defen-
dant claimed under a grant by the United States; his title pre-
vailed in the lower court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the
170. 8 Stat. 202. In French:
ART. VI. Les Etats-Unis promettent d' executer les trait~s et articles qui pouvraient
avoir ete convenus entre l'-Espagne et les tribus et nations Indig~nes, jusqu'A ce que,
due consentement mutual des Etats-Unis, d'une part, et des Indig~nes, de I'autre, iI
y ait 6t substitu6 tels autres articles qui seront jug~s convenables.
171. See, e.g., the Treaty with the Choctaw of July 14, 1784, the Treaty with the
Choctaw and Chickasaw of May 10, 1793, and the Treaty with the Chickasaw and other
tribes of October 28, 1793, in ESPANA Y LOS INDIOS CHERoKIS Y CHACTAs 82 (M. Serrano
y Sanz ed. 1916).
172. See United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U.S. 180, 186 (1894).
173. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
174. Id. at 561.
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judgment when brought up by writ of error.' " Although conceding
that the question presented was not a difficult one, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote a long opinion to address the "able and elaborate
arguments of the bar" arising out of "the magnitude of the in-
terest in litigation,"' 7 6 which adopted the view "that discovery
gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, it was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession."' 77 Such
sovereign title was exclusive, good against the whole world, but
limited in its effect on the aboriginal owners:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were,
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were ad-
mitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it accord-
ing to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sover-
eignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whom-
soever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of
the natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion
to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence
of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet
in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood
by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the In-
dian right of occupancy. 78
Spain did not rely solely upon the papal donation, but, Chief
Justice Marshall said, based her title "on the rights given by
discovery."' 79 This statement, as has been seen, is correct only
insofar as Spain asserted dominion over vacant lands. Lands over
which Indians had possession and some form of governmental
dominion were unaffected by the Spanish overlordship; indeed,
as Book VI of the Recopilaci6n exhaustively shows, Spanish legisla-
tion went to elaborate lengths to protect and preserve Indian
landholdings.
175. Id. at 605.
176. Id. at 604.
177. Id. at 573.
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Chief Justice Marshall did not stop at asserting discovery title;
in a passage worthy of Gin~s de Sepfilveda, he argued that title
by conquest was attained because of Indian "savagery":
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern
them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were
as brave and as high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready
to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things?
The Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning
the country, and relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or
of enforcing those claims by the sword, and by the adoption
of principles adapted to the condition of a people with whom
it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as
a distinct society, or of remaining in their neighborhood and
exposing themselves and their families to the perpetual hazard
of being massacred.
Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not
always the aggressors, unavoidably ensued. European policy,
numbers and skill prevailed. As the white population advanced,
that of the Indians necessarily receded. The country in the im-
mediate neighborhood of agriculturists became unfit for them;
the game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the
Indians followed. The soil, to which the crown originally claimed
title, being no longer occupied by its ancient inhabitants, was
parcelled out according to the will of the sovereign power, and
taken possession of by persons who claimed immediately from
the crown, or mediately, through its grantees or deputies.' 80
Up to this point, the Chief Justice's opinion poses no logical or
analytical difficulty. He has posited that since discovery extinguish-
ed Indian title, ergo, an Indian tribe could not convey a title that
had been invalidated by discovery. But then he arrives at the real
reason for upholding the grant from the United States, and in
so doing, discards the rationale of title by discovery:
Another view has been taken of this question which deserves
to be considered. The title of the crown, whatever it might be,
could be acquired only by a conveyance from the crown. If
180. Id. at 590-91; compare text, supra at notes 49-54.
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an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own
benefit, or in other words, might purchase it, still he could ac-
quire only that title. Admitting their power to change their laws
or usages, so far as to allow an individual to separate a portion
of their lands from the common stock, and hold it in severalty,
still it is a part of their territory, and is held under them, by
a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy
from their will; and, if they choose to resume it, and make
a different disposition of the land, the courts of the United
States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. The per-
son who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory,
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property
purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject
to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal
which can revise and set aside the proceeding. We know of no
principle which can distinguish this case from a grant made to
a native Indian, authorizing him to hold a particular tract of
land in severalty.
As such a grant could not separate the Indian from his na-
tion, nor give a title which our courts could distinguish from
the title of his tribe, as it might still be conquered from, or
ceded by his tribe, we can perceive no legal principle which will
authorize a court to say that different consequences are attached
to this purchase, because it was made by a stranger. By the
treaties concluded between the United States and the Indian na-
tions, whose title the plaintiffs claim, the country comprehend-
ing the lands in controversy has been ceded to the United States,
without any reservation of their title. . . . Their cessation of
the country, without a reservation of this land, affords a fair
presumption, that they considered it as of no validity. They
ceded to the United States this very property, after having used
it in common with other lands, as their own, from the date
of their deeds to the time of cession; and the attempt now made,
is to set up their title against that of the United States.'
Marshall thus recognized that, despite discovery or conquest, In-
dian title exists until extinguished by a government exercising
ultimate sovereignty. Therefore, the extensive discussion in M'In-
tosh of title being acquired by discovery or conquest is obiter.
Using Ockham's Razor"" to excise the excess Marshallian rhetoric,
181. Id. at 592-94.
182. Ockham's Razor is the analytical tool whereby unnecessary assumptions are dis-
carded or ignored in attempting to analyze causality. It was honed by the medieval
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it is clear that what the plaintiffs asserted title over, and what
the Indians had sold their predecessors in title, was vacant land,
land which the Indians did not possess. In the passage just quoted,
Marshall observes that when the Indians ceded the land to the
United States, they did not reserve the land previously conveyed
to plaintiffs' ancestor in title since it can be fairly presumed that
"they considered it [the grants] as of no validity,"'1 3 that is, it
was a grant of land over which the Indians did not exercise the
rights of use and occupancy. Further, Marshall cites the British
Royal Proclamation of 1763 reserving vacant lands as not those
occupied and possessed by Indians, and "the vacant soil is to be
disposed of by that organ of government which has the constitu-
tional power to dispose of the national domains, by that organ
in which all vacant territory is vested by law." ' Assuming for
the sake of argument that there exist "vacant lands" unused by
Indians for seasonal subsistence purposes,' and also assuming,
arguendo, that a foreign sovereign can arrogate to himself these
"vacant lands" by discovery, if the Piankeshaw and Illinois In-
dians purport to convey such vacant and unoccupied lands to a
third person, they convey nothing.
That is the real holding in M'Intosh. Why so few persons, even
those sympathetic to Indian rights, 8 6 have not carefully read M'In-
tosh is itself something of a mystery, especially when it is quite
obvious that Marshall gives the game away in the concluding pages
of his opinion.
Finally, it must be noted that Marshall insists that, even under
the rubric of conquest, where incorporation of the conquered with
the victorious nation is practicable, "the rights of the conquered
to property should remain unimpaired,"'8 7 and that, even though
"the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants,
philosopher William of Ockham (?1290-1349) as an analytical tool. See 3 F. COPLESTON,
A HISTORY OF PmLosopHy (Part I), 80-87 (1963).
183. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 594.
184. Id. at 595.
185. Cf. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 (1835):
Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and modes
of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared
fields of the whites; and their right to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way and
for their own purposes, were as much respected, until they abandoned them, made
a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals.
186. Such as Justice William 0. Douglas, who, as a dissenter in Shoshone Indians
v. United States 324 U.S. 335, 349 (1945) states that the United States might have "ex-
tinguished Indian title by the sword. .. .
187. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
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[they are] to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the posses-
sion of their lands. . ,,.188
Subsequent decisions on aboriginal title have unquestioningly
followed M'Intosh, the most recent, and most egregious, being
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.'9 Yet even Tee-Hit-Ton,
horrid as its obiter dicta is, can be cut down to size by Ockham's
Razor. The Tee-Hit-Tons, a clan of Tlingits in southeast Alaska,'90
brought an action in the Court of Claims for damages to timber
cut from their ancestral lands, approximately 352,800 acres of land
and 150 square miles of water within the Tongass National
Forest.' 9' The Court of Claims found that immemorial posses-
sion of the land and water claimed had not been proved because
the clan had become decimated by smallpox, alcoholism, and other
civilized discontents, so that they were "physically uncapable of
controlling or exploiting the area which was once the sole sup-
port of a large number of people.. .. ,, Citing M'Intosh, the
Supreme Court found that since Congress had never recognized
any legal interest of the Tee-Hit-Ton clan, the clan could not
recover damages for any violated right of occupancy.' 93 After these
gratuitous thoughts, Justice Reed, as had Chief Justice Marshall,
got down to the facts of the case. Echoing the finding of the Court
of Claims that the decrease in the clan's population meant the
clan could not possibly assert use and occupancy over such a wide
area, the Court described the Tee-Hit-Tons' case as "more a claim
188. Id. at 591.
189. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
190. As to the "Bark-house people," or Ti-hit-tan, see J. Swanton, Social Condition
Beliefs and Linguistic Relationships of the Tlingit Indians, 26th ANN. REP. BUREAU AM.
EHNu. 1904-1905, at 391-402, 509-10 (1908).
191. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 82, 85 (1954), aff'd 348 U.S.
272, 273 (1955).
192. 128 Ct. Cl. at 98. This statement makes the highly questionable assumption that
the relinquishment of the claimed area was an intentional and voluntary one, whereas
the court's own findings of fact indicate that it was caused by factors out of the people's
control:
Smallpox, hard liquor, and loose living decreased both the number of Tee-Hit-Ton
and the authority of local clan officials over individuals. At about the turn of the
century, the clan had only one woman of child-bearing age. Since that time, the clan
has had 65 or fewer people. Because of this population decrease, and changes in the
economic patterns brought about by such things as the use of powerboats for fishing,
the Tee-Hit-Ton are and have been physically incapable of controlling or exploiting
the area which was once the sole support of a larger number of people, particularly
be-muse significant amounts of time must be spent gaining a livelihood today under
conditions which preclude extensive use either of small fishing streams or hunting areas.
193. 348 U.S. 272, 278-81 (1955).
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of sovereignty than ownership."' 9 The proof, then, could only
show a diffuse and scattered use and occupancy and thus the In-
dians could not make a case under the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act. 95
M'Intosh and Tee-Hit-Ton do not, therefore, stand for the pro-
position that aboriginal title has been extinguished in the United
States by discovery or conquest. These cases show a failure of
proof, and the question naturally arises as to what is Indian title
and in what guise does it exist today?
Indian title is the Great Monad' 96 of property rights in the United
States, that is, it is the underlying and immutable concept from
which all property rights can be traced and from which all prop-
erty rights can be derived. This is a sweeping, even all-inclusive
statement, but it can be readily validated. The Philippines was
formerly a domain of Spain where, as in Louisiana, the Recopila-
cidn de las Indias was law. 97 When Spain lost the archipelago
in the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States under-
took to administer it with a guarantee of all property rights.' 9
Under the neocolonial legislation promulgated by the United States,
a landowner was obligated to register his land, and Mateo Carifio,
a member of the Igorot ethnic group of Benguet Province, at-
tempted to do so, only to have his application turned down by
one court after another, up to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
Carifio claimed that he and his ancestors had run cattle on the
land "according to the custom of the country"' 199 from time im-
memorial, but the courts in the Philippines turned down his claim
194. Id. at 287. Only one witness, the chief of the clan, testified as to this use and
occupancy, and he was only able to mark six places within the 350,000-acre area to show
use of the land. Id. at 285-86.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1505. The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 25 U.S.C. §§
70-70w, has been held to cover taking of aboriginal title without treaty or other legislative
recognition. United States v. Fort Sill Apache Tribe, 480 F.2d 819 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); United States v. Pueblo de Zia, 474 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1973);
Plamondon ex rel. Cowlitz Tribe v. United States, 467 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1972). But the
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians did not sue under this Act. Tee-Hit-Ton can thus be readily distin-
guished on that ground alone.
196. A monad is the basic substance of an existent being that is the principle and
source of its activities, but which fundamentally is impenetrable, indivisible, inert, and
indiscernible. Lnmam.Z: Tan MONADOLOGY AND OTHER Ptm.OSOPMCAL WoRKS 37-38, 45-47,
219 (R. Latta tr. and ed. 1898).
197. RECOPILACi6N, VI, 1.15 (Philip II, Nov. 7, 1574).
198. Act of July 1, 1882, ch. 1369, §§ 5, 12, 32, Stat. 692-693, 695.
199. Carifio v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449, 456 (1909).
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by asserting that since Spain's conquest of the Philippines gave
it title to all the land within the archipelago and, as the land was
public, it could not be acquired by adverse possession.00 Carifio
applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
error to review the judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court
and to his good fortune Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the
unanimous opinion of reversal in Carifio v. Insular Government.0 '
Justice Holmes begins his analysis by saying that "every
presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case
like the present. 2 2 He turned to "a subtle examination of an-
cient texts" and the attitude of Spanish law, 0 3 that is, to the
Recopilacidn:
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we
do not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law
as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with,
the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff
in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives 'vere
recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant.
In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants
at ill. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilaci6n
de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valen-
ton v. Murciano, 3 Philippines, 537, while it commands viceroys
and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of
grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants
or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic
assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in
the king or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse.
The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing
to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
1rescription is mentioned again in the royal c6dula of Oc-
tober 15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546: "Where such
possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be
200. Id. at 457. This was exactly the argument made by Chief Justice Marshall in
M'Intosh. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-85 (1823).
201. 212 U.S. 449, 455 (1909).
202. Id. at 460. Justice Holmes later observed: "In dealing with an Iggorot of the
Province of Benguet it would be absurd to expect technical niceties, and the courts below
were quite justified in their liberal mode of dealing with the evidence of possession and
the possibly rather gradual settling of the precise boundaries of the appellees' claim."
Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16, 23 (1909).
203. 212 U.S. 449, 460 (1909).
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sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid
title by prescription." It may be that this means possession from
before 1700, but at all events the principle is admitted. As
prescription, even against crown lands, was recognized by the
laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to ad-
mit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands
over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.2" '
With precision and acuity, Justice Holmes thus recognized that
native title was not vitiated by discovery or war, but continued
to exist, despite the change in sovereignty, since Carifto possessed
and owned the land under "native custom and by long associa-
tion-one of the profoundest factors in human thought ... "I"
Although a distinction was made in the opinion between the
acquisition of the Philippines by the United States and the settle-
ment of North America by the white race,2"6 it is a distinction
without a difference. Both the Philippines and North America
were "discovered" and "conquered" by European nations, and
in neither case did these nations presume to invalidate property
holdings. In any case, the holding in Cariffo, and specifically Justice
Holmes's construction of the justaprescripci6n provision, has been
204. Id. at 460-61.
205. Id. at 459.
206. Id. at 458. Justice Reed attempted to distinguish Cariflo in a footnote to Tee-Hit-
Ton. 348 U.S. 272, 284 n.1 18. He said that the Carifio Court "relied chiefly upon the
purpose of our acquisition of the Philippines as disclosed by the Organic Act of July
1, 1902, which was to administer property and rights 'for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof'. 32 Stat. 695." Of course, the United States has pledged itself to administer the
property of the Indians for their benefit as a trustee. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S.
391, 398 (1974). Justice Reed seized upon the statement in Carifio that "[tihe acquisition
of the Philippines was not like the settlement of this white race in the United States,"
whereas "the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land." 212
U.S. at 458. While that is a correct differentiation, the fiduciary obligation of the United
States toward the Indians would place precisely the same constraint on its actions vis-t-vis
its Indian wards as was imposed on its actions by the Philippine Organic Act of 1902.
The rights asserted by the Tee-Hit-Tons were, according to Justice Reed, "a rule of sovereign
ownership or dominium," whereas Cariflo makes clear that Recopilacidn IV, 12.14 is of
general application, and "titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers
of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." 212 U.S. at 461. Since Recopilacidn
IV, 12.14 was in force in the Americas, it follows that its application cannot be, and
was not, confined to those instances of an "ordinary prescriptive rights situation rather
than to a.recognition by this Court of any aboriginal use and possession amounting to
fee simple ownership." 348 U.S. at 284 n.18. But, as has been seen, Recopilacidn IV,
12.14 was not confined to the individual, and, indeed, was enacted to cover situations
of communal ownership. See text, supra, at notes 93-99.
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expressly recognized as validating original Indian title in the United
States." 7
Cari-iio is not unorthodox or revolutionary in its holding con-
cerning immemorial possession. At common law, adverse posses-
sion of sixty years could be maintained against the British crown
under a 1769 statute of George III.2"' The Bractonian doctrine
of nullum tempus occurit regi did not apply to possession of crown
lands., but rather to franchises, especially those having to do with
the administration of justice." 9 The 1769 statute became part of
the common law of the United States upon its independence in
1776, 1 and Justice Story, sitting in circuit in 1821, expressly
recognized the sixty-year period for adverse possession against the
crown.I' Certainly, any rights acquired by 1776, or on later dates
of the imposition of sovereignty, would not be affected by the
later statutory rule that adverse possession does not run against
the government.
Under British law, conquest, so heavily relied upon by Mar-
shall, was specifically held not to extinguish property rights in
the 1774 decision of the King's Bench in The Cause of the Island
of Grenada"2 where Lord Mansfield laid down the rule that if
a sovereign conquers another nation, "the conquered inhabitants
once received under the King's protection, became subjects, and
are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or
aliens," and "that the laws of a conquered country continue in
force, until they are altered by the conqueror ....2 3 It necessarily
207. See Turtle Mountain Band v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 942 (Ct. CI. 1974);
Aleut Community v. United States, 480 F.2d 831, 834-37 (Ct. Cl. 1973); United States
v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786, 792-794 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Sac & Fox Tribe v.
United States, 383 F.2d 991, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 900 (1968); Lipan
Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967).
208. 9 Geo. III, ch. 16, 10 Stat. L. 540.
209. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAIAD, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 571-72 (ed. 1898);
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 144.
210. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S.
131 (1934).
211. United States v. Hoar, Fed. Cas. No. 15,373, 26 Fed. Cas. 329, 330 (Cir. Ct.
D. Mass. 1821).
212. Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (1774).
213. 1 Cowp. at 208, 209, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1047. The Grenada case had been cited
to the Court in M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 564 (1823). Marshall distinguished
the Grenada case as a striking down of a tax on a conquered province by proclamation:
"[t]he authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected this continent, has never been
denied, and the titles it gave to lands have always been sustained by the courts." 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) at 597. But Marshall misread the Grenada case, as it most certainly held that
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follows that those rights that flow from the conquered govern-
ment, namely rights to, and arising out of, interests in property,
were not invalidated and nullified by the conquest but continue
in force after the conquest. Of course, the conquering sovereign
may prescribe different modes of protecting private property after
military conquest, but, where the sovereign guarantees the right
of property, this guarantee vests the property with indefeasible
title.2" 4
The fact is that the British sovereign did not extinguish Indian
title at any time by proclamation, nor did Parliament enact any
such confiscatory legislation. 21 5 The 1763 proclamation mentioned
by Marshall in M'Intosh 6 expressly guarantees Indian tribes and
the royal power did not extend to the confiscation of property of private citizens of a
conquered nation. Lord Mansfield says only if the sovereign commits genocide upon a
conquered people "all the lands belong to him. If he received the inhabitants under his
protection and grants them their property, he has a power to fix such terms and condi-
tions as he thinks proper." 1 Cowp. at 209, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1048. That is precisely what
the pre-Independence treaties between the British king and the Indian tribes did, as Mar-
shall acknowledged in his discussion of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
at 594.
214. It has already been shown how the Philippines, a fruit of military conquest, had
the rights of its inhabitants protected under the Organic Act of 1902 (supra note 200),
and upon which Justice Holmes relied in Cariflo. See 212 U.S. 449, 459-60. In the Mex-
ican cession, Congress prescribed different modes for the protection of property for dif-
ferent states. The United States undertook to protect property rights under article VIII
of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 930 (1848), which was modeled upon article
III of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty. See Letter from Secretary of State Buchanan to
Nicholas Trist, Apr. 15, 1847, in S. Ex. Doc. No. 52, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1848);
Message of President Polk to House of Representatives, Feb. 8, 1849, H. Ex. Doc. No.
50, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1849). For some states, Congress prescribed a survey of land
claims by the surveyor general, see United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,
348-50 (1941), but for California, Congress passed a statute which required the filing and
judicial ascertainment of land claims by all persons who claimed land in that state. Act
of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631. The constitutionality of the 1851 Act was specifically
upheld in the face of a challenge based upon article VIII that the 1851 Act operated to
forfeit the lands of those who had not filed a claim under the Act. 181 U.S. at 487-89.
Whatever its other merits or demerits, Barker did reaffirm the principle that the property
rights of persons within a conquered area were not vitiated or canceled because of the
conquest. The Barker Court concluded that because the Cupefio Indians had failed to
file a land claim under the 1851 Act, they forfeited their rights as claimants. The decision
is only defensible on the somewhat questionable factual ground that the Cupefio Indians
had previously abandoned the property in question, see 181 U.S. at 499, even though
there is substantial historical documentation to the contrary. See L. BEAN & C. Sm,
Cupeflo, 8 HANDBOOK NORTH AMERIcAN IrDAi~s: CAniomRNA, 588 (1978).
215. Cyrus Thomas invokes only discovery as the basis for the extinguishment of In-
dian title by the British crown in his Introduction, supra note 165, at 549-61.
216. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 594, 598.
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nations living under the protection of the crown freedom from
molestation or disturbance.2"7 The 1763 proclamation makes it
unquestionably clear that the British crown did not consider In-
dian title as having been destroyed by discovery or conquest since
the crown considered lands in the hinterlands, "beyond the heads
and sounds of any of the rivers," as without the royal jurisdic-
tion, as were those lands within the colonial territory that had
not "been added to, or purchased by" the crown.
Despite this apodictical language, both Marshall and later
commentators218 have maintained that the Indians only have "the
usufruct or right of occupancy to such lands as they were in
possession," 219 and that this right is not an absolute and untram-
melled one. While Indian title does not amount "to nothing,"
Marshall says, "[t]heir right to possession has never been
questioned." 220 But the fact that the crown prescribed restraints
on alienation does not amount to a confiscation of that title by
the crown since title could be passed by the Indian tribe once per-
mission had been secured from the crown. To repeat, what actually
happened in M'Intosh was, at most, a selling of vacant land and
a failure to abide by the provisions the crown had set up to pro-
tect the Indians. Thus M'Intosh is, in effect, the setting aside of
an improvident conveyance by an Indian tribe.
Even if M'Intosh's obiter dicta are conceded to be binding law,
the decision does not have any force outside the original area of
the thirteen colonies. The 1803 purchase of Louisiana gave the
United States no more rights than the Spanish had had in the
territory. Since Sublimis Deus in 1537, and the great reform legisla-
tion of the sixteenth century, codified into a coherent whole by
the Recopilacidn, the Spanish crown expressly recognized Indian
title, protected it, and attempted to preserve it by restraints on
alienation. The Mexican Cession of 1848, whereby the United States
acquired almost the remainder of its present continental breadth,
came about by military conquest, but the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo preserved the land rights of Indians that had been vested
217. See Thomas, Introduction, supra note 165, at 558 for the text of the 1763
Proclamation.
218. In his Introduction, supra note 165, Cyrus Thomas states as a general principle
that the right to own the soil flows from the discovery of the New World. See id. at
527-38, quoting extensively from M'Intosh as the "conclusive" authority. Id. at 533.
219. Id. at 534.
220. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 603.
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LIGHT OF DEAD STARS
in them by the Recoplacin and that had been further protected
by the Plan of Iguala after the independence of Mexico.
22'
These rights continue today. In Louisiana, because of a peculiar
twist in the law, the Recopilaci6n and Spanish law in general sur-
vive as positive law. Outside of Louisiana, within the Louisiana
Purchase Territory and the Mexican Cession, the rights vested in
Indian tribes to their lands are alive and well and await only an
advocate to give impetus to the vindication of "just prescriptive
rights" too long denied.
221. The Plan of Iguala abolished slavery and made Indians citizens of the Mexican
republic, capable of fully exercising their property rights. United States v. Ritchie, 57
U.S. (17 How.) 535, 538-40 (1855).
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